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ABSTRACT
RESILIENT DYNAMIC STATE ESTIMATION IN THE PRESENCE OF FALSE
INFORMATION INJECTION ATTACKS
By Jingyang Lu
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2016.
Advisor: Ruixin Niu,
Assistant Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
In this dissertation, the problem of resilient dynamic system state estimation
in the presence of false information injection attacks is investigated. First, it is
assumed that the system is unaware of the existence of false information and the
adversary tries to maximize the negative effect of the false information on Kalman
filter’s estimation performance under a power constraint. The false information attack
under different conditions is mathematically characterized. For the adversary, many
closed-form results for the optimal attack strategies that maximize Kalman filter’s
estimation error are theoretically derived. It is shown that by choosing the optimal
correlation coefficients among the false information and allocating power optimally
among sensors, the adversary could significantly increase Kalman filter’s estimation
errors.
In order to detect the false information injected by an adversary, we investigate
the strategies for the Bayesian estimator to detect the false information and defend
itself from such attacks. We assume that the adversary attacks the system with certain
ix
probability, and that he/she adopts the worst possible strategy that maximizes the
mean squared error (MSE) if the attack is undetected. An optimal Bayesian detector
is designed which minimizes the average system estimation error instead of minimizing
the probability of detection error, as a conventional Bayesian detector typically does.
The case where the adversary attacks the system continuously is also studied. In
this case, sparse attack strategies in multi-sensor dynamic systems are investigated
from the adversary’s point of view. It is assumed that the defender can perfectly
detect and remove the sensors once they are corrupted by false information injected
by an adversary. The adversary’s goal is to maximize the covariance matrix of the
system state estimate by the end of the attack period under the constraint that
the adversary can only attack the system a few times over the sensors and over the
time, which leads to an integer programming problem. In order to overcome the
prohibitive complexity of the exhaustive search, polynomial-time algorithms, such as
greedy search and dynamic programming, are proposed to find the suboptimal attack
strategies. As for greedy search, it starts with an empty set and one sensor is added at
each iteration, whose elimination will lead to the maximum system estimation error.
The process terminates when the cardinality of the active set reaches the sparsity
constraint. Greedy search based approaches such as sequential forward selection
(SFS), sequential backward selection (SBS), and simplex improved sequential forward
selection (SFS-SS) are discussed and corresponding attack strategies are provided.
Dynamic programming is also used in obtaining a sub-optimal attack strategy. The
validity of dynamic programming lies on a straightforward but important nature of
dynamic state estimation systems: the credibility of the state estimate at current step
is in accordance with that at previous step.
The problem of false information attack on and Kalman filter’s defense of state
estimation in dynamic multi-sensor systems is also investigated from a game theo-
x
retic perspective. The relationship between Kalman filter and the adversary can be
regarded as a two-person zero-sum game. The condition under which both sides of
the game will reach a Nash equilibrium is investigated.
xi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Background
System state estimation aims at monitoring the system state and providing accu-
rate information for the controller to make reliable actuation decisions for the system.
For example, the control center of a power system conducts system state estimation to
distribute the power to different regions properly [1]. Self-driving vehicles have drawn
a lot of attentions which involve the vehicle state estimation [2]. Medical diagnosis
concerns the determination of the true physiological state of the patient by gathering
the test measurements. The system becomes more vulnerable to attacks as it gets
more complicated and the adversary finds more ways to access it. For example, ac-
cording to an inspector general’s report sent to the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in 2009, hackers have broken into air traffic control mission-support systems
several times in recent years [3]. Some hackers were also able to hack wireless medical
devices implanted in human bodies [4].
As for the electric power system, it consists of apparatus, generators, electrical
transformers, and lines that can be damaged or destroyed as a result of short circuits,
thermal overload, weather, and even physical attacks. For example, in 2013, Pacific
Gas and Electric Company’s Metcalf Transmission Substation in San Jose, California
was broken by gunmen who fired on 17 electrical transformers resulting in over $15
million worth of damage. Certain detection mechanisms and corresponding defending
strategies are urgently needed in order to detect these types of abnormal conditions
and attacks and protect the system to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the
1
whole electric power system. A protection system must be dependable and secure in
all its operations. The protection devices should properly respond when an abnormal
or dangerous condition is indicated.
An increasing demand for reliable energy has motivated the development of smart
electric grid. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has identified seven properties
required for the smart grid to meet future demands including attack resistance, self-
healing, consumer motivation, power quality, generation and storage accommodation,
enabling markets, and asset optimization [5, 6]. The smart grid is applied for sensor
data reading and system control in two-way communications. The development of a
trustworthy smart grid system depends on a deeper understanding of the potential
effects of false information. A comprehensive approach to understand the security of
the system is to appropriately quantify the effect of the false information injection
attack. Studying the relation between the false information attack and the physical
system effect and designing the countermeasures to mitigate risks from the attack
will help increase the robustness of the smart grid system.
System state estimation of the power system is a key function in building real-
time models of electricity networks in the energy management centers (EMC). A real-
time model usually utilizes the data every few seconds from energy control center to
conduct the system state estimation. It is not practical and economical to measure
all the possible states in the network. System state estimation is a useful tool for
estimating the system state by using a limit set of measurements. Two kinds of
measurement information - analog and digital data are usually used in system state
estimation [7]. The control center of the system can take use of the measurement
to estimate the system state and make certain control decisions. Anomaly detection
turns to be essential when abnormal conditions like topology error or false information
injection by malicious attacks occur. Without knowing the existence of the false
2
information, the system state estimation will mislead the control center in making
decisions. The traditional detector such as Chi-square detector works by comparing
the residue between the measurement and its prediction with a threshold. However,
this detector cannot detect the false information when the adversary has knowledge
of the system configuration and launch a carefully designed attack [8]. Therefore it is
very important to design the detection mechanisms and defending strategies to avoid
the case where false information is injected into the system incurring large system
state estimation error.
System state estimation is of importance in the area of driverless cars develop-
ment. Autonomous navigation is one of the most important technologies for driverless
cars. Accurate system state estimation is generally the basis of any other functions
such as path planning and environment perception. An accurate system state es-
timate ensures the safety of a driverless car. The control center of a driverless car
conducts system state estimation based on the Global Positioning System (GPS). An
enhanced differential GPS receiver with phase carrier signal measurements may run
in operating modes of real time kinematics, which has the highest absolute position
accuracy. In addition to the driverless cars, system state estimation and anomaly de-
tection also play a key role in the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
The theoretical models sometimes may not work because the natural environment is
very complicated, and many abnormal conditions may happen. The control center
of the system has to be able to detect anomalies and improve the performance of
system state estimation. Different types of attacks may be launched by an adversary
to the UAV. Hardware attacks can happen when the adversary has direct access to
the UAV’s autopilot components. An adversary can corrupt the data stored on the
board or add extra data to mislead the whole control system. Wireless attacks can
also happen when the adversary has access to the communication channel so that
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they can change the data stored on-board in real time. In order to overcome this, a
more accurate and resilient state estimation system needs to be designed.
For the radar system, the false information is usually caused by jammers, which
can apply various techniques of misleading a radar system. It could be either mechan-
ical or electronic [9]. An electronic jammer misleads the radar system by injecting
jamming signals through the communication channels. The distributed MIMO radar
system consists of multiple of transmitters, receivers, and a fusion center where the
final system state estimate is made [10]. Even though it has been shown that the
distributed MIMO radar system can provide better performance than the traditional
radar system, it increases the vulnerability of the system itself as well. If the dis-
tributed MIMO radar system is built under the nominal condition that there are no
false information attacks, system state estimation is significantly affected even under
a low-level attack.
A lot of techniques have been utilized in developing system state estimation.
Reinforcement learning, a machine learning approach, is concerned with how the
control center makes corresponding actions by optimizing the cumulative reward.
It has been heavily used in advertising, robot design, deriving complex hierarchical
schemes, and learning non-ambiguous models. Reinforcement learning can be applied
to cases where a model of the environment is known, but an analytic solution is not
available. The way to get the information about the environment is by interacting
with it. Reinforcement learning uses samples to optimize the performance and uses
function approximation to deal with large environments. The reinforcement problems
are specified by a Markov Decision Process, which in some cases can be shown to be
equivalent to a shortest-path problem.
Another popular state estimation approach is Kalman filter, which uses series
of sensor measurements overtime to conduct system state estimation in the presence
4
of random noise. At each recursion, the algorithm works in two steps: prediction
and update. In the prediction step, Kalman filter makes a prediction of the current
state. In the update step, the current state estimate is updated by the residue be-
tween the measurement and its prediction. Kalman filter estimates the system state
by recursively conducting Bayesian estimation. Kalman filter has been applied in
wide and diverse areas. Kalman filter is widely used in robotic motion planning and
control. It also works for characterizing the human’s central nervous system’s control
of movement, and supports the realistic model by making system state estimation
and issuing the updated commands [11].
System state estimation in the presence of an adversary that injects false informa-
tion into sensor readings has attracted much attention in wide application areas, such
as target tracking with compromised sensors, secure monitoring of dynamic electric
power systems, and radar tracking and detection in the presence of jammers. This
topic has been studied in [8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. In [8], the problem
of taking advantage of the power system configuration to introduce arbitrary bias to
the system without being detected was investigated and inspired many researchers to
further study false information injection along this direction. In [12] the impact of
malicious attacks on real-time electricity market concerning the locational marginal
price was investigated and how the attackers can make profit by manipulating cer-
tain values of the measurements was shown. Some strategies are also provided to
find the optimal single attack vector. The relationship between the attackers and the
control center was discussed in [13], where both the adversary’s attack strategies and
the control center’s detection algorithms have been proposed. Readers are referred
to [14] and [15] for more about false information attacks on the electricity market.
Inspired by [8], in [16] it was shown that the data frame attack can be formulated as
a quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP) problem, in which deleting
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the comprised sensors which the defender system detects will make the system unob-
servable. In [17], the relation between a target and an MIMO radar was characterized
as a two-person zero-sum game. However, in the aforementioned publications, only
the problem of static system state estimation has been considered.
For a linear dynamic system, the impact of the injected false information on
Kalman filter’s state estimation performance over time has not got much attention
in the literature. In many problems with multiple target information variables [21],
one is interested in the mean squared error (MSE) matrix of the state estimate. As
the defender, the object is minimizing the system state estimation MSE matrix, i.e.
to achieve the smallest system estimation error. Here we introduce several measures
of the system state estimation MSE matrix and describe their physical meanings:
• The trace of the state estimation MSE matrix, that is the summation of the
diagonal entries, is mostly used to evaluate the performance for numerous esti-
mation tasks. The trace captures the total expected squared error in estimation
problems.
• The determinant of the state estimation MSE matrix, is also used in the system
state estimation problems, which captures the volume of the error ellipsoid
around the true state value. It also measures the mutual information between
the unknown state and observations in estimation problems.
• The MSE matrix itself can also be used in formulating the objective function.
From an adversary’s point of view, the optimal attack strategies under certain
constraints such as power constraints would be the optimal solutions leading
the state estimation MSE matrix to be the largest positive semidefinite matrix.
This guarantees the optimality in terms of trace or determinant of the MSE
matrix.
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Sensor management plays an important role in increasing the resilience of the system
state estimation. Some related publications exist on sensor management [22, 23],
where the problem of arranging the sensors to minimize the covariance of the state
estimation error so that a more accurate state estimate can be obtained, was inves-
tigated. In [24], the problem of sensor bias estimation and compensation for target
tracking has been addressed. Interested readers are referred to [24] and the references
therein for details.
The impact of the injected biases on a Kalman filter’s estimation performance
was presented in [18], showing that if the false information is injected at a single time,
its impact converges to zero as time goes on; if the false information is injected into
the system continuously, the estimation error tends to reach a steady state.
1.2 New Contributions
Based on [18], we have obtained some results regarding optimal false information
attacks. In [25], we have found that the best strategies for the adversary to attack
Kalman filter system from the perspective of the trace of the MSE matrix, and ob-
tained some closed-form results. In [26], a closed-form optimal attack strategy was
found for the adversary, which maximizes the impact of the false information injection
on Kalman filter’s state estimation from the determinant perspective. By adopting
the objective function as the determinant of the MSE matrix, we change the problem
significantly. The optimal attack strategy that maximizes the determinant of the
MSE matrix is a function of Kalman filter’s state estimation covariance and hence
“adaptive” to Kalman filter; whereas the optimal solution that maximizes the trace
of the MSE matrix is not a function of Kalman filter’s state estimation covariance.
In this dissertation, we also investigate the detection of false information injection
attacks [27]. More particularly, our goal is to design the optimal Bayesian detector
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minimizing the average system estimation error. For a Bayesian estimator whose
sensors could be attacked by false information injected by an adversary, we investigate
the strategies for the Bayesian estimator to detect the false information and defend
itself from such attacks. We assume that the adversary attacks the system with certain
probability, and that he/she adopts the worst possible strategy which maximizes the
MSE if the attack is undetected. The defender’s goal is to minimize the average system
estimation MSE instead of minimizing the probability of error, as a conventional
Bayesian detector typically does. The cost functions are based on the traces of the
MSE matrices of the estimation error. Numerical results show that the new detection-
estimation structure outperforms that based on the traditional detectors such as the
conventional Bayesian detector and the chi-square detector significantly in terms of
the average MSE. One proposed detection-estimation strategy, discarding sensor data
when the presence of attack is declared, is very robust even when the attacker uses
an attack strategy significantly different from the one assumed by the defender.
There are still a lot of problems left to be solved. In [28, 29], the optimal attack
strategies are studied when the adversary aims to maximize the state estimation
MSE matrix of the system state estimate by the end of the attack period under the
constraint that the adversary can only attack the system a few times over time and
over sensors and the defender has the perfect detection mechanism, which leads to
an integer programming problem. The exhaustive-search is intractable even when
the size of problem increases moderately. Greedy search based approaches such as
sequential forward selection (SFS), sequential backward selection (SBS), and simplex
improved sequential forward selection(SFS-SS) have been discussed in the dissertation
and corresponding attack strategies are provided. Considering the credibility of the
current estimate is in accordance with that of the previous estimate in dynamic state
estimation systems, dynamic programming (DP) is also used, which helps reduce the
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time complexity by memorizing the internal results during the process to obtain a
suboptimal attack strategy.
As for the case where the defender knows the existence of the false information,
game theory is utilized to find the Nash Equilibrium between the defender and adver-
sary [30]. The relationship between Kalman filter and the adversary can be regarded
as a two-person zero-sum game. Under which condition both sides of the game will
reach a Nash equilibrium is investigated. The multi-sensor Kalman filter system and
the adversary are supposed to be rational players. Kalman filter and the adversary
have to choose their respective subsets of sensors to perform system state estimation
and false information injection. It is shown how both sides pick their strategies in
order to gain more and lose less.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The rest of dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the discrete-time
linear dynamic system and Kalman filter system are introduced. The optimal attack
strategies which the adversary can adopt under a power constraint are investigated
and studied. An optimal Bayesian detector which minimizes the average system
estimation MSE is designed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the sparse attack strategies
are analyzed under the assumption that Kalman filter has the perfect detection of
such attacks. The adversary aims to maximize the covariance matrix of the system
state estimate by the end of the attack period with the sparsity constraint. The
relation between the defender and the adversary is characterized and studied using
game theory in Chapter 5. Conclusion is drawn in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
ATTACK STRATEGY ANALYSIS
In this chapter, Kalman filter system is presented and the impact of false informa-
tion injection is investigated for linear dynamic systems with multiple sensors. It is
assumed that the system is unsuspecting the existence of false information and the
adversary is trying to maximize the negative effect of the false information on Kalman
filter’s estimation performance. The false information attack under different condi-
tions is mathematically characterized. For the adversary, many closed-form results
for the optimal attack strategies that maximize Kalman filter’s estimation error are
theoretically derived. It is shown that by choosing the optimal correlation coefficients
among the bias noises and allocating power optimally among sensors, the adversary
could significantly increase Kalman filter’s estimation errors.
2.1 Kalman Filter System
2.1.1 Linear Dynamic State Estimation
The discrete-time linear dynamic system [31] can be described as below,
xk+1 = Fkxk + Gkuk + vk (2.1)
where Fk is the system state transition matrix, xk is the system state vector at time k,
uk is a known input vector, Gk is the input gain matrix, and vk is a zero-mean white
Gaussian process noise with covariance matrix E[vkv
T
k ] = Qk. The measurement
equation is
zk = Hkxk + wk (2.2)
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where wk is zero-mean white Gaussian measurement noise, and
E[wkw
T
k ] = Rk (2.3)
The matrices Fk, Gk, Hk, Qk, and Rk are assumed to be known with proper di-
mensions and possibly time varying. The initial state x0 in general is unknown and
modeled as Gaussian distributed with known mean and covariance. The two noise
sequences and the initial state are mutually independent. Sometimes, vk is taken as
Γkvk with vk being an nv-dimensional vector and Γk a known nx × nv matrix. Then
the covariance matrix of the noise in the state equation can be written as
E
[
(Γkvk) (Γkvk)
T
]
= ΓkQkΓ
T
k (2.4)
The linearity of (2.1) and (2.2) ensures the preservation of the Gaussian property
of the state and measurements. The estimate of the system state xi based on the
observations up to time k can be written as,
xˆi|k = E
[
xi|Zk
]
(2.5)
where
Zk = {zj : j = 1, · · · , k} (2.6)
If i = k, the conditional mean is called the estimate of the system; if i < k, the
conditional mean is called the smoothed value of the state; if i > k, the conditional
mean is called predicted value of the state. The estimation error is defined as
x˜i|k = xi − xˆi|k (2.7)
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The conditional covariance matrix of xi given the data Z
k or the covariance associated
with the estimate is
Pi|k = E
[(
xi − xˆi|k
) (
xi − xˆi|k
)T |Zk] (2.8)
2.1.2 The Recursive Estimation Algorithm
In terms of a linear and Gaussian observation z according to the minimum
mean squared error (MMSE) criterion, the estimate of x with prior information
x ∼ N(x¯,Pxx) is
xˆ = E [x|z] = x¯ + PxzP−1zz (z− z¯) (2.9)
and the corresponding MSE is
Pxx|z = E
[
(x− xˆ)(x− xˆ)T ] = Pxx −PxzP−1zz Pzx (2.10)
Given the initial estimate xˆ0|0 of x0 and the associated initial covariance P0|0, the
cycle of the dynamic estimation will consider mapping the estimate
xˆk|k = E
[
xk|Zk
]
(2.11)
which is the conditional mean of the state at the time k, and the covariance matrix
Pk|k = E
[
[xk − xˆk|k][xk − xˆk|k]T |Zk
]
(2.12)
into the corresponding variables at the next stage, that is to say, xˆk+1|k+1 and Pk+1|k+1.
Since the process noise is white and Gaussian, the predicted state xˆk+1|k is
xˆk+1|k = E
[
xk+1|Zk
]
= E
[
Fkxk + Gkuk + vk|Zk
]
(2.13)
= Fkxˆk|k + Gkuk
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The state prediction error, namely the difference between the system state and its
prediction is
x˜k+1|k = xk+1 − xˆk+1|k = Fkx˜k|k + vk (2.14)
Using the equation above, we can get the state prediction covariance as
Pk+1|k = E
[
x˜k+1|kx˜Tk+1|k|Zk
]
(2.15)
= FkE
[
x˜k|kx˜Tk|k|Zk
]
FTk + E
[
vkv
T
k
]
= FkPk|kFTk + Qk
The predicted measurement is the expectation of the measurement conditioned on
Zk,
zk+1|k = E
[
zk+1|Zk
]
(2.16)
= E
[
Hk+1xk+1 + wk+1|Zk
]
= Hk+1xˆk+1|k
The measurement prediction error is
z˜k+1|k = zk+1 − zˆk+1|k = Hk+1x˜k+1|k + wk+1 (2.17)
Thus the measurement prediction covariance, which is defined as Sk+1, is
Sk+1 = Hk+1Pk+1|kHTk+1 + Rk+1 (2.18)
The covariance between the state and measurement is
E
[
x˜k+1|kz˜Tk+1|k|Zk
]
= E
[
x˜k+1|k
[
Hk+1x˜k+1|k + wk+1
]T |Zk] (2.19)
= Pk+1|kHTk+1
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The filter gain can be calculated as
Wk+1 = Pk+1|kHTk+1S
−1
k+1 (2.20)
Thus the updated state estimate can be written as
xˆk+1|k+1 = xˆk+1|k + Wk+1τk+1 (2.21)
where
τk+1 = zk+1 − zˆk+1|k = z˜k+1|k (2.22)
which is called innovation or measurement residual. Finally, the updated covariance
of the state at time k + 1 is,
Pk+1|k+1 = Pk+1|k −Pk+1|kHTk+1S−1k+1Hk+1Pk+1|k (2.23)
= Pk+1|k −Wk+1Sk+1WTk+1
An alternative form for the covariance update can be provided as
P−1k+1|k+1 = P
−1
k+1|k + H
T
k+1R
−1
k+1Hk+1 (2.24)
2.1.3 Statistical Test for Filter Consistency
Under the linear-Gaussian assumption, the conditional probability density func-
tion of the state xk at the time k is
p(xk|Zk) = N (xˆk,Pk|k) (2.25)
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Based on (2.25), we can get the first two moments,
E
[
xk − xˆk|k
]
= E
[
x˜k|k
]
= 0 (2.26)
E
[[
xk − xˆk|k
] [
xk − xˆk|k
]T]
= E
[
x˜k|kx˜Tk|k
]
= Pk|k
Define the normalized estimation error squared as
k = x˜
T
k|kP
−1
k|kx˜k|k (2.27)
Under hypothesis H0 that the filter is consistent and linear Gaussian assumption, k
is Chi-square distributed with nx degrees of freedom, where nx is the dimension of
the system state x, and
E [k] = nx (2.28)
Based on the Monte Carlo simulations with N independent samples ik, i = 1, ..., N ,
the sample average of k can be obtained,
¯k =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ik (2.29)
It can be shown that N¯k follows a Chi-square distribution with Nnx degrees of
freedom. The hypothesis of H0 is accepted if
¯k ∈ [r1, r2] (2.30)
where the acceptance interval is determined such that
P{¯k ∈ [r1, r2]|H0} = 1− α (2.31)
and α is the power of the test.
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2.2 System Model
For a discrete-time linear dynamic system described in Section 2.1.1, let us as-
sume that M sensors are used by the system. The measurement at time k collected
by sensor i is
zk,i = Hk,ixk,i + wk,i (2.32)
with Hk,i being the measurement matrix, and wk,i a zero-mean white Gaussian mea-
surement noise with covariance matrix E[wk,iw
T
k,i] = Rk,i, for i = 1, · · · ,M . We
further assume that the measurement noises are independent across sensors. The
matrices Hk,i and Rk,i are assumed to be known with proper dimensions. In this
dissertation, we assume that a bias bk,i is injected by the adversary into the measure-
ment of the ith sensor at time k intentionally. Therefore, the measurement equation
(2.32) becomes
z′k,i = Hk,ixk + wk,i + bk,i = zk,i + bk,i (2.33)
where z′k,i is the corrupted measurement, bk,i is either an unknown constant or a
random variable independent of {vk,i} and {wk,i}. For compactness, let us denote the
system sensor observation as zk = [z
T
k1, · · · , zTkM ]T , which contains the observations
from all the M sensors. Similarly, let us denote the system bias vector as bk =
[bTk1, · · · ,bTkM ]T which includes the biases at all the M sensors. Correspondingly, the
measurement matrix becomes
Hk = [H
T
k1, · · · ,HTkM ]T (2.34)
With these notations, it is easy to convert (2.32) and (2.33) into the following equa-
tions respectively.
zk = Hkxk + wk (2.35)
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and
z′k = zk + bk (2.36)
Further, we have the measurement error covariance matrix corresponding to wk is
Rk =

Rk,1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · Rk,M
 (2.37)
which is obtained by using the assumption that measurement noises are independent
across sensors.
2.3 Impact of False Information Injection
Let us first assume that the adversary attacks the system by injecting false in-
formation into the sensors while Kalman filter is unaware of such attacks. We start
with the case where biases (bk) are continuously injected into the system starting
from a certain time K. Note that single injection is just a special case of continuous
injection when bk are set to be nonzero at time K and zero otherwise. In the contin-
uous injection case, Kalman filter’ extra mean square error (EMSE), which is caused
by the continuous bias injection alone, is derived in [32] and provided as follows.
Proposition 1 When the bias sequence {bk} is zero mean, random, and independent
over time, the EMSE at time K +N due to the biases injected at and after time K,
denoted as AK+N , is
AK+N =
N∑
m=0
DmΣK+N−mDTm (2.38)
where Dm =
(∏m−1
i=0 BK+N−i
)
WK+N−m, and BK = (I−WKHK) FK−1.
∏−1
i=0 BK+N−i =
I is an identity matrix, WK is Kalman filter gain [31], and ΣK+N−m is the covariance
matrix of bK+N−m.
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2.4 Attack Strategies from Trace Perspective
Firstly, we investigate the optimal attack strategy that an adversary can adopt to
maximize the system estimator’s estimation error. This problem can be formulated as
a constrained optimization problem. Without loss of generality, let us consider that
the attacker is interested in maximizing the system state estimation error at time K
right after a single false bias is injected at time K. In this case, we are interested in
designing the injected random bias’ covariance matrix such that
max
ΣK
Tr
[
PK|K + AK(ΣK)
]
s.t. Tr(ΣK) = a
2 (2.39)
where a is a constant, Tr(·) is the matrix trace operator, and PK|K is Kalman filter’s
state estimation error covariance matrix at time K in the absence of any false infor-
mation. Note that it is meaningful to have a constraint on the trace of ΣK , since it
can be deemed as the power of injected sensor bias bK , and a smaller power for bK
reduces the probability that the adversary is detected by the system estimator using
an innovation based detector. Note that the optimization problem is equivalent to
one that maximizes Tr (AK(ΣK)), since PK|K is not a function of ΣK , and trace is a
linear operator. If one is more interested in the determinant of the estimation MSE
matrix, a similar optimization problem can be easily formulated as follows.
max
ΣK
∣∣PK|K + AK(ΣK)∣∣
s.t. Tr(ΣK) = a
2 (2.40)
To simplify the mathematical analysis, it is helpful to derive the equivalent sensor
measurement, which is a linear combination of the observations from all the sensors,
and is a sufficient statistic containing all the information about the systems state.
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The equivalent sensor measurement vector and its corresponding covariance matrix
should have much smaller dimensionality than the original measurement vector and
its covariance, making the mathematical manipulation and derivation later in the
dissertation much simpler. In a information filter recursion [31], which is equivalent
to Kalman filter recursion, we have
yˆk|k = yˆk|k−1 + HTkR
−1
k zk (2.41)
where yˆk|k = P−1k|kxk|k and yˆk|k−1 = P
−1
k|k−1xk|k−1. It is clear that yˆk|k−1 represents the
prior knowledge about the system state based on past sensor data, and the second
term in (2.41) represents the new information from the new sensor data zk, which
can be expanded by using (2.34) and (2.37) as follows.
HTkR
−1
k zk
= [HTk1, · · · ,HTkM ]

R−1k1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · R−1kM


zk1
...
zkM

=
M∑
i=1
HTkiR
−1
ki zki
(2.42)
In the following derivations, we skip the time index k for simplicity. Our purpose is
to find an equivalent measurement ze such that
ze = Hex + we (2.43)
where we ∼ N (0,Re), and
HTe R
−1
e ze =
M∑
i=1
HTi R
−1
i zi (2.44)
Let us consider two cases. First, suppose all the His are the same (Hi = H) , then it
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is natural to set He = H. Note that a sufficient condition for (2.44) to be true is
ze = Re
M∑
i=1
R−1i zi (2.45)
Finding the covariance on the both sides of (2.45), we get
Re = Recov
(
M∑
i=1
R−1i zi
)
RTe
= Re
[
M∑
i=1
R−1i Ri(R
−1
i )
T
]
RTe
(2.46)
This implies that
Re =
(
M∑
i=1
R−1i
)−1
(2.47)
In the second case, let us assume that the system state x is observable based on
the observations from all the sensors, meaning that the Fisher information matrix∑M
i=1 H
T
i R
−1
i Hi is invertible. In this case, by setting He = I, using (2.44), and
following a similar procedure as in the first case, we have
ze = Re
M∑
i=1
HTi R
−1
i zi (2.48)
and
Re =
(
M∑
i=1
HTi R
−1
i Hi
)−1
(2.49)
We have derived the optimal strategies concerning position-sensor case to max-
imize the trace of the state estimation MSE matrix as provided in the following two
propositions [25].
Proposition 2 For a system with M sensors, if the adversary injects independent
random noises, the best strategy is to allocate all the power to the sensor with the
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smallest measurement noise variance.
Proposition 3 For a system with M sensors, the optimal strategy for the adversary
is to inject dependent random noises with a pairwise correlation coefficient of 1. The
noise power is allocated such that σbi =
cia√∑M
j=1 c
2
j
, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, where σbi is the
standard deviation (s.d.) of the noise injected to the ith sensor, ci =
1/σ2wi∑M
j=1
(
1/σ2wj
) and
σwi is the ith position-only sensor’s measurement noise s.d.
As for the case where sensors measure both position and velocity of the tar-
get, the best attack strategy for single sensor and multiple sensors are studied and
corresponding optimal attack strategies are shown as follow,
Proposition 4 For a system with one sensor observing position and velocity of the
target, the optimal strategy for the adversary is to inject random noise that has de-
pendent position and velocity components. If w11w12 + w21w22 > 0, the correlation
coefficient ρbp,bv should be set as 1, and the random bias power is allocated such that
σbp = a sin(θ
∗) (2.50)
σbv =
a
T
cos(θ∗)
θ∗ =
pi
4
− φ
2
φ = arctan
[
β2 − β1T 2
2T (α1 + α2)
]
w211 + w
2
21 = β1
w212 + w
2
22 = β2
w11w12 = α1
w21w22 = α2
When w11w12 + w21w22 < 0, we should set ρbp,bv = −1 and set α1 = −w11w12 and
α2 = −w21w22. The rest of the equations in formula (2.50) remains the same.
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As for attack strategy for multiple position and velocity sensors, equivalent sensor is
utilized to find the best attack strategy. Based on Proposition 1, we get the EMSE
matrix,
AK+N =
N∑
m=0
DmΣK+N−mDTm
Suppose at time K, the adversary wants to attack the system continuously from time
K to K +N , the weight for different time is αm,m ∈ {1, · · · , N}, as shown below,
A
′
K = α0(D0ΣKD
T
0 )
A
′
K+1 = α1(D0ΣK+1D
T
0 + D1ΣKD
T
1 ) (2.51)
...
A
′
K+N = αN(D0ΣK+ND
T
0 + ...+ DNΣKD
T
N)
where
∑N
m=0 αm = 1. So the objective function in the multi-shot attack case is
the trace of the weighted sum of the EMSE matrices at different time points that
is
∑N
m=0 αmAK+m =
∑N
m=0 A
′
K+m. It is equivalent to maximize the trace of the
weighted sum of the MSE matrices of the state estimates, because once the sys-
tem reaches its steady state, PK+m|K+m becomes constant, and the weighted sum
of PK+m|K+m will remain the same. First we study the case where the system has
position sensors which are being attacked, so all the items above are scalars. Using
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lower case d, σ2p to denote D,Σ, we can formulate the optimization problem below,
max
σpK ,··· ,σpK+N
N∑
m=0
αmAK+m =
N∑
m=0
A
′
K+m (2.52)
= σ2pK (α0d
2
0 + α1d
2
1 + ...+ αNd
2
N)
+σ2pK+1(α1d
2
0 + α2d
2
1 + ...+ αNd
2
N−1)
+σ2pK+2(α2d
2
0 + α3d
2
1 + ...+ αNd
2
N−2)
+...
+σ2pK+N (αNd
2
0)
s.t.
K+N∑
m=K
σ2pm ≤ a2
N∑
m=0
αm = 1
The adversary can allocate the power based on the coefficients of the variance variables
at different time. For example, if the weights α′ms are all the same, the best strategy
is to allocate all the power to the sensors at the first beginning (at time K) because
the coefficient for σ2pK is the largest. Second, if the sensors measure both position and
velocity, and the attacker aims to attack the system with position and velocity false
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information, the optimization problem can be characterized as below,
max
ΣK ,··· ,ΣK+N
Tr
[
N∑
m=0
αmAK+m
]
= Tr
[
N∑
m=0
A
′
K+m
]
(2.53)
= Tr
[
ΣK(α0D
T
0 D0 + ...+ αND
T
NDN)
]
+Tr
[
ΣK+1(α1D
T
0 D0 + ...+ αND
T
N−1DN−1)
]
+Tr
[
ΣK+2(α2D
T
0 D0 + ...+ αND
T
N−2DN−2)
]
+...
+Tr
[
ΣK+N(αND
T
0 D0)
]
s.t.
K+N∑
m=K
σ2pm + T
2σ2vm ≤ a2
N∑
m=0
αm = 1
where Σm and D
T
j Dj are positive semidefinite matrices, so Tr
[
Σm(D
T
j Dj)
] ≥ 0
all the time. The trace function Tr(·) is a monotonically increasing function of the
positive semidefinite matrix. So the best strategy for the adversary to attack the
system is to put all the power at the time with the largest positive semidefinite
matrix.
2.5 Attack Strategies from Determinant Perspective
For the position-only sensors, we are interested in the effect of bias information
on Kalman filter’s MSE matrix from the determinant perspective as follows,
|PK|K + AK | = |PK|K + ΣeKD0DT0 |
= |PK|K ||I + ΣeKD0P−1K|KDT0 |
(2.54)
where D0 is defined in Proposition 1. As PK|K is constant and positive definite,
D0P
−1
K|KD
T
0 is positive semidefinite meaning that all the eigenvalues of D0P
−1
K|KD
T
0
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are non-negative. First, let us denote C as a square matrix whose columns are the
eigenvectors of D0P
−1
K|KD
T
0 . Then through eigendecomposition, (2.54) can be written
concisely as,
|PK|K ||CIC−1 + ΣeKCΛC−1|
= |PK|K ||I + ΣeKΛ|
(2.55)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the eigenvalues of the
D0P
−1
K|KD
T
0 . So we just need to maximize ΣeK in order to maximize the determinant
of PK|K +AK . This is equivalent to maximizing the trace of PK|K +AK as discussed
in Section 2.4.
For the position-and-velocity sensors, we assume that the adversary knows the
system model and the prior information P0|0 at time zero, so that he/she can calculate
the oﬄine Kalman filter gain matrix Wk recursively. The best attack strategy is the
solution to the following optimization problem.
max
ΣK
∣∣PK|K + WKΣKWTK∣∣
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2 (2.56)
−1 ≤ ρbp,bv ≤ 1
σbp , σbv > 0
where WKΣKW
T
K = AK , and
ΣK =
 σ2bp ρbp,bvσbpσbv
ρbp,bvσbpσbv σ
2
bv
 (2.57)
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Using the properties of the determinant, we get the formula as follows.
|PK|K + WKΣKWTK |
= |PK|K ||In + ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK | (2.58)
Since PK|K is independent of ΣK , the optimization problem can be further written
as:
max
ΣK
∣∣∣In + ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2 (2.59)
−1 ≤ ρbp,bv ≤ 1
σbp , σbv > 0
By defining
WTKP
−1
K|KWK =
 m1 m2
m2 m3
 (2.60)
and after simplifying (2.59), the objective function becomes∣∣∣In + ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
= 1 + (1− ρ2bp,bv)σ2bpσ2bv(m1m3 −m22) (2.61)
+σ2bpm1 + σ
2
bvm3 + 2ρbp,bvσbpσbvm2
The optimal solution to the problem will be the best strategy to attack the system.
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We denote ΣK = R
TR and since ΣK is invertible, we have∣∣∣In + ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣In + RTRWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣ (2.62)
=
∣∣∣In + RWTKP−1K|KWKRT ∣∣∣
In order to obtain the optimal solution, two useful lemmas [33] are introduced
as follows,
Lemma 1 Suppose A and B are n × n positive semidefinite matrices with eigende-
composition A = ΨAΣAΨ
T
A and B = ΨBΣBΨ
T
B, the eigenvalues of A and B satisfy
that α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αn and β1 ≥ β2 ≥ · · · ≥ βn, then
Πni=1(αi + βi) ≤ det(A + B) ≤ Πni=1(αi + βn+1−i) (2.63)
where the upper bound is achieved if and only if ΨA = ΨBΘ, the lower bound is
achieved if and only if ΨA = ΨB, and Θ is the matrix defined below,
0 0 · · · 1
0 · · · 1 0
...
...
...
...
1 0 · · · 0

(2.64)
Readers are referred to [33] for the proof of Lemma 1. The optimal solution to find
the upper bound is the best strategy to attack the system with the most effect on
Kalman filter system and the lower bound is the least attack effect the adversary can
get.
Lemma 2 Given a n×n matrix V1 and a n×n positive semidefinite matrix Ξ1 with
V1Ξ1V
T
1 being a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements in increasing order, it is
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always possible to find another n×n matrix V¯1 such that V¯1Ξ1V¯T1 = βV1Ξ1VT1 with
Tr(V1V
T
1 ) = Tr(V¯1V¯
T
1 ) where β ≥ 1. V¯1 can be written as ΣΞΨT1 , where Ψ1 is the
unitary matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues
of Ξ1 in increasing order, and ΣΞ is a diagonal matrix.
By combining the two lemmas together, we can get the final optimal solution to the
optimization problem above. It is obvious that In and RW
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T are both
positive semidefinite matrices, and their eigendecomposition can be written as follows,
In = Ψ1Σ1Ψ
T
1
RWTKP
−1
K|KWKR
T = Ψ2Σ2Ψ
T
2 (2.65)
with identity matrix Σ1 = diag([σ1,1, · · · , σ1,n]) and Σ2 = diag([σ2,1, · · · , σ2,n]), where
σ2,i, i ∈ {1, · · · , n} is the diagonal element of the matrix Σ2. Based on Lemma 1, we
can get, ∣∣∣In + RWTKP−1K|KWKRT ∣∣∣ ≤ Πni=1(σ2,i + 1) (2.66)
where Ψ1 = Ψ2Θ.
|In + RWTKP−1K|KWKRT |
= |ΨT1 ||In + RWTKP−1K|KWKRT ||Ψ1| (2.67)
= |In + ΨT1 RWTKP−1K|KWKRTΨ1|
Set R1 = Ψ
T
1 R and Σ3 = ΘΣ2Θ
T with the eigenvalues of increasing order and
Tr(RRT ) = Tr(R1R
T
1 ). So the optimization problem can be written as below,
max |In + R1WTKP−1K|KWKRT1 |
s.t. T r(R1R
T
1 ) ≤ a2 (2.68)
R1W
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T
1 = Σ3
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Setting WTKP
−1
K|KWK = Ξ˜, we have R1Ξ˜R
T
1 = Σ3. Based on Lemma 2, we can
surely find a matrix R¯ such that R¯1Ξ˜R¯
T
1 = βR1Ξ˜R
T
1 , with β ≥ 1. Note that det(·)
is a monotonic increasing function of the positive semidefinite matrix. So
|In + R1Ξ˜RT1 | ≤ |In + R¯1Ξ˜R¯T1 | (2.69)
So the optimal solution R¯ should be in the form of V¯. The eigendecompostion of Ξ˜
is as follows,
Ξ˜ = VΞΣΞV
T
Ξ (2.70)
where ΣΞ = diag([σξ,1, σξ,2, · · · , σξ,n]) in increasing order. VΞ is a unitary matrix
whose column vectors corresponds to the eigenvalues of Ξ˜. The problem can be
written as
max
σ2b,i
n∑
i=1
log(σ2b,iσξ,i + 1) (2.71)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
(σ2b,i) ≤ a2
The objective function above is a concave and increasing function. The optimal
solution is achieved through Lagrangian multipliers yielding the water-filling strategy,
σ2b,i =
(
1
λ
− 1
σξ,i
)+
(2.72)
where the value of λ can be obtained by solving
n∑
i=1
(
1
λ
− 1
σξ,i
)+
= a2 (2.73)
The solution is
Ropt = Ψ1[Σ
1/2
b ]
TVTΞ (2.74)
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Finally, the optimal solution of (2.59) is,
ΣK = VΞΣbV
T
Ξ (2.75)
2.6 Numerical Results
Some numerical results are presented in this section to illustrate the theoretical
results.
2.6.1 System with Position Sensors
The parameters used in the target tracking example are provided below. The
system sampling interval is T = 1. The adversary injects bias information to two
sensors with σ2w1 = 3 and σ
2
w2
= 4, respectively. The variance of the system process
noise is σ2v = 0.25. The biases bis are zero-mean Gaussian random variables with
variances σ2bis. For the power constraint we discussed earlier, we set the sum of σ
2
bi
to
be 3000.
The effect of the bias injection on Kalman filter is measured by a Chi-squared
test. More specifically, we use the sum of the normalized MSE over Nm Monte-Carlo
runs
qk =
Nm∑
j=1
[
xˆ′jk|k − xjk
]T
P−1k|k
[
xˆ′jk|k − xjk
]
(2.76)
where at time k, Pk|k is the nominal state covariance matrix calculated by Kalman
filter, xˆ′jk|k is the state estimate, and x
j
k is the true state, during the jth Monte-Carlo
run. First, if the random biases injected to different sensors are independent, we
should allocate all the bias power to the sensor with the smallest measurement noise
variance. This is clearly true as demonstrated in Fig. 1, where allocating all the power
to sensor 1 causes the maximum mean squared estimation error. In Fig. 2, three
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Fig. 1. The normalized MSE for independent biases. σ2b1 + σ
2
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= a2 for each case.
dependent-noise attack strategies are compared, including the optimal one according
to Proposition 3, allocating the power equally among the sensors, and allocating all
the power to the sensor with smallest measurement error variance. It is clear that
the optimal solution has the largest impact on the estimation performance, and it
outperforms the best independent-noise attack strategy significantly.
2.6.2 Systems with Position and Velocity Sensors
We now consider the case where the adversary attacks Kalman filtering system
with a vector sensor observation containing both position and velocity measurements.
We first consider a single-sensor system, and the sensor has a position measurement
variance of 3 and a velocity measurement variance of 4. We set the sum of σ2bp1 and
T 2σ2bv1 to be 3000. In this particular case, w11w12 + w21w22 > 0, so the optimal
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choice is ρbp,bv = 1. Based on Theorem 4, the best strategy is to set σbp = 52.3 and
σbv = 16.2. It is clear from Fig. 3 that the strategy provided in Theorem 4 maximizes
the MSE of Kalman filter system by injecting vector bias information.
Next we consider a system with two sensors. The first sensor is the same as
the one described above, and the second one is with position measurement vari-
ance 4 and velocity measurement variance 5. In this particular case, again we have
w11w12 + w21w22 > 0, so all the ρs in s1, s2, and s3 should be set as 1. We first
use a systematic grid search to find an approximate globally optimal solution and
then we use the FMINCON function in Matlab, a local search algorithm, to refine
this approximate globally optimal solution. The optimal solution we have obtained
is σ2bp1 = 1826, σ
2
bp2
= 1023, σ2bv1 = 81, σ
2
bv2
= 68. For comparison purposes, we also
implement an attack strategy that allocates power equally among the observation
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components and among the two sensors, which is σ2bp1 = σ
2
bp2
= σ2bv1 = σ
2
bv2
= 750.
The simulation result is shown in Fig. 4. As we can see, the optimal attack strategy
has a much greater impact than the one that allocates power equally. Based on the
optimal solution, we can find that allocating more power to the measurement with
lower variance will have a greater effect on Kalman filter system.
2.6.3 Determinant Perspective
Numerical results are presented in this section to illustrate the effectiveness of
the proposed attack strategies. Assuming that the injected bias noise bk is zero-
mean and Gaussian distributed, we can show that the posterior probability density
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σ2p1 + σ
2
p2
+ T 2σ2v1 + T
2σ2v2 = a
2 for each case.
function (PDF) of the target state conditioned on the past observations and the
current corrupted observation is
p(xK |z1:K−1, z′K) = N (xˆK|K ,PK|K + AK) (2.77)
where xˆK|K is the updated state estimate calculated by Kalman filter, which is un-
aware of the presence of the injected false information. Then the target state xK will
be in the following confidence region (or error ellipse)
{
x : (x− xˆK|K)T (PK|K + AK)−1(x− xˆK|K) ≤ γ
}
(2.78)
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with probability determined by the threshold γ [34]. The volume of the confidence
region defined by (2.78) corresponding to the threshold γ is
V (K) = cnx|γ(PK|K + AK)|1/2 (2.79)
where nx is the dimension of the target state x,
cn =
pin/2
Γ(n/2 + 1)
(2.80)
and Γ(·) is the gamma function. First, let us consider a single-sensor case, where
the sensor has a position measurement with noise variance of 3, which is independent
of the velocity measurement with noise variance of 4. We set the bias noise power
constraint as σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = 3000. We solve the optimization problem formulated
in Section 2.5 numerically, and the optimal solution to (2.56) is σ2bp = 1500, σ
2
bv
=
1500, ρbp,v = 0.063. In Fig. 5, error ellipsis for different attack strategies are plotted.
For all the different attack strategies, we set ρbp,v = 0.063. As we can see, under
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normal condition without false information injection, the error ellipse has the smallest
area, while the optimal attack strategy leads to an error ellipse with the largest area.
In Figs. 6 and 7, the volume (area) of the error ellipse is provided as a function of
ρbp,v and the ratio κ =
σbp
σbvT
. We can see that when the κ =
σbp
σbvT
= 1, the area of
the ellipse is maximized. Also from Figs. 6 and 7, it is clear that the area of ellipse
increases as the absolute value of ρ decreases. In Fig. 8, the trend of the error ellipsis
as the ρ changes from −1 to +1 is illustrated.
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Fig. 6. Error ellipse volume for the positive correlation case
In this particular case, since σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = 3000, ΣK is large and in (2.56) the
second term (WKΣKW
T
K) dominates. Therefore, in (2.61) the identity matrix in the
objective function is relatively small comparing to the second item, and approximately
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we have ∣∣∣In + ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
≈ |ΣK |
∣∣∣WTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣ (2.81)
The second term in the second line of the above equation is a constant. Hence,
in order to get the maximum determinant, we should set σ2bp = σ
2
bv
T 2 and ρbp,bv =
0. This is almost the same solution as we have obtained numerically. Next we
consider a system with two sensors. The first sensor is the same as the one described
above, and the second one is with position measurement variance 4 and velocity
measurement variance 5. To solve the optimization problem formulated in (2.56), we
first use a systematic grid search to find an approximate globally optimal solution and
then we use the FMINCON function in Matlab, a local search algorithm, to refine
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this approximate globally optimal solution. The optimal solution we have obtained
is σ2bp1 = 1100, σ
2
bp2
= 600, σ2bv1 = 750, σ
2
bv2
= 550, ρbp1,p2 = 0.99, ρbp1,v1 =
−0.83, ρbp1,v2 = 0.75, ρbv1,p2 = 0.89, ρbp2,v2 = −0.23, ρbv1,v2 = 0.95. For comparison
purpose, we introduce three sub-optimal attack strategies: Strategy I with all the ρs
being 0s, and σ2bp1 = 1100, σ
2
bp2
= 600, σ2bv1 = 750, σ
2
bv2
= 550; Strategy II with all
the ρs being 1s, and σ2bp1 = 1100, σ
2
bp2
= 600, σ2bv1 = 750, σ
2
bv2
= 550; and Strategy
II with the ρs being the same as those for the optimal strategy, and σ2bp1 = σ
2
bp2
=
σ2bv1 = σ
2
bv2
= 750. The numerical results are shown in Fig. 9. As we can see, the
optimal attack strategy has a greater impact than those sub-optimal attack strategies,
resulting in the largest error ellipse.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we derived the EMSE due to the injected random biases for a
Kalman filter in a discrete-linear dynamic system. This allows us to find how to
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allocate the bias power among multiple sensors in order to maximize the effect of
the false information on Kalman filter from two perspectives: trace and determi-
nant. A concrete example of multi-sensor target tracking system has been provided.
In this example, we investigated both the case where the sensors provide position
measurements and the case where they collect both position and velocity measure-
ments. Further, many closed-form results have been provided for the optimal attack
strategies.
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CHAPTER 3
FALSE INFORMATION DETECTION WITH MINIMUM MEAN
SQUARED ERRORS
The problem of false information detection has not been discussed. In this chapter,
the optimal Bayesian detector minimizing the average system estimation error will
be investigated. For a Bayesian estimator whose sensors could be attacked by false
information injected by an adversary, we investigate the strategies for the Bayesian
estimator to detect the false information and defend itself from such attacks. We
assume that the adversary attacks the system with certain probability, and that
he/she adopts the worst possible strategy which maximizes the MSE if the attack is
undetected. The defender’s goal is to minimize the average system estimation MSE
instead of minimizing the probability of error, as a conventional Bayesian detector
typically does. The cost functions are based on the traces of the MSE matrices of the
estimation error. Numerical results show that the new detection-estimation structure
outperforms the traditional detectors such as the conventional Bayesian detector and
the chi-squared detector significantly in terms of the average MSE. One proposed
detection-estimation strategy, discarding sensor data when the presence of attack is
declared, is very robust even when the attacker uses an attack strategy significantly
different from the one assumed by the defender.
3.1 System Model
For a general linear and Gaussian system, the measurement z is supposed to be
z = Hx + w (3.1)
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where H is the measurement matrix, x is the nx× 1 system state vector and w is the
measurement noise which is supposed to be white and Gaussian. In this dissertation,
we assume that a bias b is injected by the adversary into the sensor measurement
intentionally. Therefore, the measurement equation (3.1) becomes
z′ = Hx + w + b = z + b (3.2)
where z′ is the corrupted measurement, b is a random variable independent of w and
x. Therefore, the two hypotheses can be modeled as follows.
H0 : z = Hx + w (3.3)
H1 : z = Hx + w + b
where H0 denotes that there is no attack with prior probability P (H0) = p0, H1
denotes the alternative hypothesis with probability P (H1) = p1. Let us suppose
that the following prior information is known: x ∼ N (x; x¯,Pxx), x¯ = E(x), w ∼
N (w; 0,Pww), and b ∼ N (b; 0,Pbb). The cost function is defined as follows.
c = P (H1) [P (D1|H1)c1 + P (D0|H1)c2] (3.4)
+P (H0) [P (D1|H0)c3 + P (D0|H0)c4]
where c is the total cost and ci, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are the cost functions which are the
traces of the MSE matrices of the estimator in different scenarios: correct detection
of the attack, missed detection of the attack, false alarm, and correct rejection of
the attack hypothesis. Dj|Hi, i, j ∈ {0, 1} denotes that the detector decides Dj
when the true underlying hypothesis is Hi. It is easy to show that under H1, the
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probabilities of detection and miss are
P (D1|H1) =
∫
R1
p(z|H1)dz (3.5)
P (D0|H1) = 1− P (D1|H1) (3.6)
respectively. R1 is the decision region for D1, and
p(z|H1) = |2piPzz,H1|−1/2e−
1
2
(z−z¯)TP−1zz,H1 (z−z¯) (3.7)
where z¯ = E(z) = Hx¯.
Pzz,H1 = E[(z− z¯)(z− z¯)T ] (3.8)
= HPxxH
T + Pww + Pbb
Similarly, under H0, the probabilities of false alarm and its complement are
P (D1|H0) =
∫
R1
p(z|H0)dz (3.9)
P (D0|H0) = 1− P (D1|H0) (3.10)
respectively.
p(z|H0) = |2piPzz,H0|−1/2e−
1
2
(z−z¯)TP−1zz,H0 (z−z¯) (3.11)
and
Pzz,H0 = HPxxH
T + Pww
Therefore, (3.4) can be rewritten as:
c = p1c2 + p0c4 +
∫
R1
[p1(c1 − c2)p(z|H1)
+p0(c3 − c4)p(z|H0)]dz (3.12)
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Clearly, in order to minimize the cost function, we should include z in R1 if the
integrand is negative for that value of z.
Theorem 1 For the problem formulated above, the optimal Bayesian detector that
minimizes the average MSE, c, is
p1(c1 − c2)p(z|H1) + p0(c3 − c4)p(z|H0)
D0
≷
D1
0. (3.13)
where ci, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are the traces of the estimator MSE matrices in different
scenarios respectively.
In the following, we consider two defending strategies and derive the optimal
detector when the system adopts each strategy to defend itself.
3.1.1 Discarding Sensor Data after Detection
In this defense strategy, once the defender declares an attack either in the case
of D1|H1 or D1|H0, sensor data will be discarded. Hence, the estimator is left with
only the prior information about the state x, and the trace of the MSE matrix in
these two cases is
c1 = c3 = Tr(Pxx) (3.14)
Under D0|H1 when the system fails to detect the false information, the MSE has been
derived in [25] and provided below:
c2 = Tr[Pxx −Pxz,H0P−1zz,H0Pzx,H0 (3.15)
+Pxz,H0P
−1
zz,H0
PbbP
−1
zz,H0
Pzx,H0 ]
= Tr
[
Pxx −Pxz,H0P−1zz,H0(I−PbbP−1zz,H0)Pzx,H0
]
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where Pxz,H0 = P
T
zx,H0
= PxxH
T . When the defender declares no attack under H0,
which is the best case for the defender, we have
c4 = Tr(Pxx −Pxz,H0P−1zz,H0Pzx,H0) (3.16)
It is easy to show that c3 > c4 always holds. In the case where c2 > c1, we get
c2 > c1 = c3 > c4, and the optimal detector is based on normalized distance squared,
which is provided in Corollary 1. In the case where c2 < c1, the term on the left hand
side of the inequality in (3.13) will always be positive leading the system to declare
no attack. This is a very interesting result, which basically means that since the cost
of missing the detection of the false information (c2) is smaller than that of correctly
detecting the false information (c1), the detector will always declare D0, even under
hypothesis H1. The derived optimal Bayesian detector for the strategy of discarding
sensor data once D1 is declared is provided in the following corollary. We name this
detection-estimation strategy optimal Bayesian Detection and Discarding corrupted
sensor data (OBDD).
Corollary 1 For the defending strategy of discarding sensor data after declaring the
presence of false information, under the condition c1 < c2, or equivalently
Tr
[
Pxz,H0P
−1
zz,H0
(I−PbbP−1zz,H0)Pzx,H0
]
< 0, the optimal Bayesian detector that min-
imizes the average MSE is,
(z− z¯)T (P−1zz,H0 −P−1zz,H1)(z− z¯)
D1
≷
D0
α (3.17)
where α is
α = 2 ln
p0(c3 − c4)|Pzz,H1|1/2
p1(c2 − c1)|Pzz,H0|1/2
(3.18)
When c1 > c2, the optimal Bayesian detector is to always declare no attack (D0).
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Clearly, when c2 < c1, the derived optimal detector is no longer a LRT based detector.
3.1.2 Incorporating Sensor Data after Detection
In this strategy, once the defender declares the presence of false information,
instead of discarding the sensor data, it will take advantage of the information from
the sensor for estimation by changing the sensor model from (3.1) to (3.2). In the
case of D1|H1, we have,
c1 = Tr(Pxx −Pxz,H1P−1zz,H1Pzx,H1) (3.19)
where Pxz,H1 = P
T
zx,H1
= PxxH
T = Pxz,H0 . But this strategy will also incur more
error when the system wrongly declares D1 when H0 is true (D1|H0), in which case
we have
xˆ = x¯ + Pxz,H1P
−1
zz,H1
(z− z¯) (3.20)
and the MSE is,
c3 = Tr
(
E[(x− xˆ)(x− xˆ)T ]) (3.21)
= Tr(Pxx + Pxz,H1P
−1
zz,H1
Pzz,H0P
−1
zz,H1
Pzx,H1
−2Pxz,H0P−1zz,H1Pzx,H0)
The cost functions c2 and c4 will remain the same as in Subsection 3.1.1. Hence, we
have
c2 − c1 = (3.22)
Tr
[
Pxz,H0(P
−1
zz,H1
−P−1zz,H0 + P−1zz,H0PbbP−1zz,H0)Pzx,H0
]
Because Pbb is a positive semidefinite matrix, there exists a matrix K such that
Pzz,H1 = Pzz,H0 + Pbb = Pzz,H0 + KK
T (3.23)
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Based on (3.23), denoting A = P−1zz,H1 , we have
A = (3.24)
P−1zz,H0 −P−1zz,H0K(I + KTP−1zz,H0K)−1KTP−1zz,H0
Denoting B = P−1zz,H0 −P−1zz,H0KKTP−1zz,H0 , then we have
A−B = P−1zz,H0K[I− (I + KTP−1zz,H0K)−1]KTP−1zz,H0
(3.25)
Since KTP−1zz,H0K is a positive semidefinite matrix, according to the spectral theorem,
there exist an orthogonal matrix U and a real diagonal matrix Λ such that
A−B = P−1zz,H0K[I− (I + UΛUT )−1]KTP−1zz,H0
= P−1zz,H0KU[I− (I + Λ)−1]UTKTP−1zz,H0 (3.26)
where I− (I+Λ)−1 has positive diagonal entries. We can see from the formula above,
A−B is still a positive semidefinite matrix, so Tr(A−B) is positive, and c2−c1 > 0.
Now let us consider the sign of c3 − c4. It can be shown that
c3 − c4 (3.27)
= Tr(Pxz,H0P
−1
zz,H0
Pzx,H0
+Pxz,H1P
−1
zz,H1
Pzz,H0P
−1
zz,H1
Pzx,H1
−2Pxz,H0P−1zz,H1Pzx,H0)
= Tr[Pxz,H0(P
−1
zz,H0
+ P−1zz,H1Pzz,H0P
−1
zz,H1
−2P−1zz,H1)Pzx,H0 ]
= Tr(Pxz,H0P
−1
zz,H1
PbbP
−1
zz,H0
PbbP
−1
zz,H1
Pzx,H0)
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Clearly, the matrix inside the trace operator in (3.27) is positive semidefinite,
and we have c3 > c4. The Optimal Bayesian Detector for the strategy of detection
and Incorporating sensor data (OBDI) is provided in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 For the defending strategy of incorporating sensor data after declaring
the presence of false information, knowing that c3 > c4 and c2 > c1, the optimal
Bayesian detector that minimizes the average MSE is,
(z− z¯)T (P−1zz,H0 −P−1zz,H1)(z− z¯)
D1
≷
D0
α (3.28)
where α is
α = 2 ln
p0(c3 − c4)|Pzz,H1|1/2
p1(c2 − c1)|Pzz,H0|1/2
(3.29)
3.2 Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE) Estimator
Given all the system information, we can also derive the MMSE estimator of the
system state. Using Bayes’ rule, it could be shown that the MMSE estimator, or the
conditional mean is
E(x|z) =
∫
xp(x|z)dx (3.30)
=
p0p(z|H0)
p(z)
[
x¯ + Pxz,H0P
−1
zz,H0
(z− z¯)]
+
p1p(z|H1)
p(z)
[
x¯ + Pxz,H1P
−1
zz,H1
(z− z¯)]
where
p(z) = p0p(z|H0) + p1p(z|H1) (3.31)
p(z|H0) = N (z; Hx¯,Pzz,H0), and p(z|H1) = N (z; Hx¯,Pzz,H1).
We show later in the chapter that even the MMSE estimator gives the best
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estimation performance in terms of MSE, it is not robust and does not perform very
well when the true system parameters deviate from the nominal parameters. On the
other hand, the OBDD approach provides robust performance even when there is a
mismatch between the nominal and the actual parameters.
3.3 Numerical Results
In this section, the optimal Bayesian detectors are applied both in a one-dimensional
tracking system and a static parameter estimation system to detect false information.
They are compared with other widely used detection/estimation strategies, such as
the CBD that minimizes the probability of error (Pe), the chi-square detector (CSD),
and the MMSE estimator.
3.3.1 Target Tracking Example
The state equation used in Kalman filter target tracking system is [31]:
xk+1 = Fkxk + vk (3.32)
where xk = [ξ ξ˙] is the system state vector at time k, and ξ and ξ˙ represent the
target’s position and velocity along the ξ-axis at time k respectively. The state
transition matrix is
F =
 1 T
0 1
 (3.33)
where T = 1 s is the time interval between measurements. The process noise is
vk = Γvk, where vk is a zero mean white acceleration noise, with variance σ
2
v . In this
example, we set σ2v = 0.25, and the vector gain multiplying the scalar process noise
is given by ΓT = [T 2/2 T ]. The covariance matrix of the process noise is therefore
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Q = σ2vΓΓ
T . Under H1, the measurement equation is provided as follows.
zk = Hkxk + wk + bk (3.34)
where Hk is a 2× 2 identity matrix. Suppose that Kalman filter runs 200 iterations
and the false information bk is injected to Kalman filter system at time k = 100
with probability p1 = 0.85, and the total bias power for the position and velocity
takes different values in the following range: σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2 ∈ [7.5, 120]. The false
information b is zero-mean Gaussian random noise. The optimal covariance matrix
Pbb for bk has been derived in [25], which maximizes c2, i.e.
Tr
[
Pxx −Pxz,H0P−1zz,H0(I −PbbP−1zz,H0)Pzx,H0
]
(3.35)
as given in (3.15). We assume that the adversary uses this Pbb to attack Kalman filter
system. The effect of the bias injection on Kalman filter is measured by the average
MSE over Nm = 10000 Monte-Carlo runs,∑Nm
j=1 [x− xˆ]T [x− xˆ]
Nm
(3.36)
The optimal Bayesian detectors either discarding or incorporating sensor data
after they make a decision of D1 are compared with the CSD and the CBD. The CSD
we use is
(z− zˆ)TP−1zz,H0(z− zˆ)
D1
≷
D0
5.99 (3.37)
with a false alarm rate of Pfa = 0.05, and the CBD, which minimizes the probability
of error, is
p(z|H1)
p(z|H0)
D1
≷
D0
p0
p1
(3.38)
Similar to the OBDD, in both the CBD and CSD, once a decision D1 is declared, the
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sensor data will be discarded,
It is clear from Figs. 10, 11, and 12, the OBDI leads to the smallest MSE. This
is because it takes advantage of all the sensor data even when D1 is declared.
When the false information power is low, the OBDD has a smaller MSE than
the CBD, even though the former has a larger Pe than the latter. The reason for the
OBDD’s larger Pe is because when the false information power is small, it will always
declare no attack (D0) to minimize the MSE instead of Pe. This is also clear from
Fig. 11, in which for small false information power, both Pfa and Pd (probability of
detection) for OBDD are zeros. The CSD gives the worst performance in terms of
the average MSE, when the false information power is large, this is because it does
not use the prior information of p0 and p1, or the information about Pbb, and it has
a poorer Pd than other detectors, when the false information power is large. With a
large prior probability p1 = 0.85 for hypothesis H1, to minimize Pe, the CBD always
declares the presence of an attack (D1) in this particular example.
3.3.2 Parameter Estimation Example
The second example involves a static parameter estimation system. The prior in-
formation about a parameter x is x¯ = [10, 5]T , Pxx =
100 0
0 100
, the measurement
matrix H = I is a 2 × 2 identity matrix, and Pww =
3 0
0 4
. The false information
b is injected to the system with p1 = 0.85, and Pbb =
σ2b1 0
0 σ2b2
. The false infor-
mation power is σ2b1 + σ
2
b2
= a2 ∈ [0, 400]. It can be shown that the optimal attack
strategy that maximizes c2 in (3.15) is Pbb =
a2 0
0 0
, which is used by the adversary
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to attack the system. From Fig. 13, it is clear that the MMSE estimator leads to
the smallest MSE, the OBDI has a performance which is very close to the MMSE
estimator, the OBDD provides the third smallest MSE. Again, the OBDD scarifies
Pe performance to achieve a smaller MSE than the CBD when the false information
power is small. The CSD provides a better MSE performance than the CBD when
the false information power is small, but a larger MSE when the false information
power becomes larger.
3.3.3 Robustness Analysis
In this subsection, we assume that the setting is almost the same as that in
Subsection 3.3.2. Let us suppose that the defender uses the nominal Pbb to design
the various detectors or the MMSE estimator, assuming that the adversary puts all the
power to the measurement with the smaller variance. However, the adversary’s actual
power allocation strategy is just the opposite by injecting all the power to the other
measurement. The false information power is σ2b1 + σ
2
b2
= a2 ∈ [0, 400]. Simulation
results show that the OBDD has the best performance in this case, as illustrated in
Fig. 14. This is because the OBDD will discard the sensor data once it declares D1,
which makes it less susceptible to the mismatch in the system model. As for the CBD
and CSD, since they will discard the sensor data once they declare the presence of an
attack, their performance will not affected much by the model mismatch either. Their
results are not provided in Fig. 14 for the ease of presentation. On the other hand,
since both the MMSE estimator and the OBDI try to incorporate the sensor data
even when D1 is declared, their performances are significantly degraded as shown in
Fig. 14.
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3.4 Conclusion
For a Bayesian estimation system whose sensors are attacked by false information
injected by an adversary, we have derived the optimal Bayesian detection strategies
which help the system achieve the smallest average estimation MSE. The proposed
Bayesian detectors minimize the average MSE instead of the probability of error, and
they may not be the LRT based detectors any more. Different defending scenarios
cases: either discarding or taking advantage of sensor data declared to be compro-
mised by the false information were investigated. Numerical results show that the
derived Bayesian detectors lead to significantly smaller average MSE than the tradi-
tional detectors, such as the conventional Bayesian detector and chi-squared detector.
In addition, the optimal Bayesian detector coupled with the defending strategy of
discarding sensor data once the presence of an attack is declared, proves to be very
robust to the mismatch between the model assumed by the defender and that actually
adopted by the attacker.
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Fig. 10. Performances of different detectors
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CHAPTER 4
SPARSE ATTACK STRATEGIES
So far we have discussed the optimal strategies the adversary can adopt to attack the
system under the assumption that the control center is unaware of the existence of
the false information. In this chapter, it is assumed that the system can perfectly
detect and remove sensors once they are corrupted by false information injected by
an adversary. The adversary aims to maximize the covariance matrix of the system
state estimate by the end of the attack period under the constraint that the adversary
can only attack the system a few times over time and over sensors, which leads to an
integer programming problem.
4.1 Problem Formulation
Based on notations introduced in Chapter 2 and using the information filter form
[31] for Kalman filter, the state prediction covariance at time k+1, denoted as Pk+1|k,
is shown below,
Pk+1|k = FkPk|kFTk + Qk (4.1)
and the updated state covariance matrix at time k + 1, denoted as Pk+1|k+1, can be
obtained as
P−1k+1|k+1 = P
−1
k+1|k +
M∑
i=1
HTk+1,iR
−1
k+1,iHk+1,i (4.2)
It is assumed that the system has perfect detection of the existence of the false
information, that is to say, its false information detector’s probability of false alarm
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is 0 and probability of detection is 1. The adversary needs to decide when and which
sensors to attack under the sparsity constraint, which leads to an integer programming
problem. It is assumed that the system has M sensors and the adversary attacks the
system from time K + 1 to time K + N . The active sensor set, which includes the
sensors being attacked by the adversary at time k ∈ {K + 1, · · · , K +N}, is denoted
as Ak, where 0 ≤ |Ak| ≤M , and | · | is the cardinality of a set. A = ∪Ak is the sensor
set that includes the sensors attacked by the adversary over time. The active set
Ak is designed in order to maximize the system estimation error under the sparsity
constraint |A| = c. Base on the perfect detection assumption, if one sensor is attacked
at certain time, Kalman filter will not use the measurement from that sensor at that
time to perform system state estimation. Define the sensor set D = {s1, ..., sM},
where si denotes the ith sensor. For each time k ∈ {K + 1, · · · , K +N}, the inverse
of the updated state covariance matrix is provided as follows
P−1k|k = P
−1
k|k−1 +
∑
i∈D\Ak
HTk,iR
−1
k,iHk,i (4.3)
The adversary aims to maximize the state estimation error covariance matrix
PK+N |K+N by the end of the attack period, and the problem can be formulated as
follows,
max
A
Φ
(
PK+N |K+N
)
(4.4)
s.t. |A| = c
where function Φ (·) could be either trace or determinant of a matrix and PK+N |K+N
is calculated iteratively using (4.1) and (4.3). That is to say, a subset is chosen
out of the whole option set so that the object function will be maximized, leading
to the largest estimation error. The optimal solution can be obtained by using the
59
exhaustive search to check all the different sensor combinations. For each candidate
sensor combination, N iterations have to be performed to evaluate Kalman filter’s
covariance matrix over time, and for each iteration, there are roughly M matrix
additions as shown in (4.3), leading to a complexity of n = MN . The complexity for
the exhaustive search algorithm is therefore
ϕ1(n) = n
n!
(n− c)!c! = n
c∏
i=1
n+ 1− i
i
(4.5)
4.1.1 Greedy Search Based Approaches
Concerning the high complexity of the exhaustive algorithm, it will be infeasible
to find the optimal solution as the size of problem increases. Some suboptimal al-
gorithms, including sequential forward selection (SFS), sequential backward selection
(SBS), and SFS improved by the simplex approach (SFS-SS) [35, 36] are proposed to
find the attack strategies. The SFS starts with an empty set for A, and one sensor
is added at each iteration, whose elimination from the system will lead to the maxi-
mum MSE. This process terminates when |A| reaches c. The pseudo code of the SFS
algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. The complexity of the SFS is provided below
ϕ2(n) = n [n+ (n− 1) + ...+ (n− c+ 1)] (4.6)
=
2cn2 − c(c− 1)n
2
which has a complexity of O(n2).
SBS solves the problem in the opposite direction. The SBS starts with a set A
containing all the sensors over all the time steps, and one sensor is reduced at each
iteration, whose addition to the system will lead to the minimum reduction in the
state estimation’s MSE. This process terminates when |A| reaches c. The complexity
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of SBS is O(n3):
ϕ3(n) = n [n+ n− 1 + ...+ c+ 1] (4.7)
=
n3 + n2 − (c2 + c)n
2
Comparing (4.7) to (4.6), it is clear that the SFS is preferable in terms of com-
putational complexity.
Algorithm 1 Sequential Forward Selection
1: A0=∅; j = 0
2: ind+ = argmaxind/∈Aj Φ
(
Aj ∪ {ind})
3: update Aj+1 = Aj ∪ {ind+}
4: j = j + 1
5: if j < c, go to 2
6: end
As for SFS-SS, it tries to improve the suboptimal solution found by the SFS. SFS-
SS works by checking whether replacing a sensor in the active set with a sensor in the
inactive set will increase the system estimation error. The index of active set Ainitial
achieved from SFS is sorted in the order the sensors are selected by the SFS. The
SFS-SS starts from the (c−1)th sensor in the active set and checks whether replacing
this sensor with any sensor in the inactive set will increase the system estimation
error. If no improvement is found, the next sensor in the active set will be checked.
Otherwise, the sensor in Ainitial is replaced with the sensor found from the inactive
set and the cth sensor is to be checked in the next iteration. Once the first sensor in
Ainitial is checked and no more improvement is found, the algorithm terminates. The
pseudo code of the SFS-SS is provided in Algorithm 2.
4.1.2 Dynamic Programming
Another computationally tractable suboptimal solution to the formulated integer
programming problem is dynamic programming (DP). Consider the cases where once
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Algorithm 2 Simplex Improved SFS
1: A=Ainitial
2: i = c− 1
3: s+ = argmaxind/∈A Φ ((A\{i}) ∪ {ind})
4: if Φ ((A\{i}) ∪ {s+}) > Φ (A) then
5: Update A = (A\{i}) ∪ {s+}, i = c
6: else
7: i = i− 1
8: if i > 0, go to 3
9: end
Pk|k−1 and |Ak| are given, the optimal attack strategy at snapshot k is certain, i.e., Ak
can be determined without enumerating all the M -choosing- |Ak| combinations. Such
cases are common for systems with scalar-valued measurements, where the optimal
attack strategy is to attack the Ak sensors with the smallest measurement variances.
For such systems, we can develop a DP algorithm, which can also be performed in
polynomial time, and is optimal if the system state is scalar-valued.
First, note that the predicted state covariance matrix Pk|k−1 in (4.2) or (4.3)
satisfies
Pk|k−1 = Fk−1Pk−1|k−1FTk−1 + Qk−1, (4.8)
which is only a function of Pk−1|k−1. Combining (4.8) and (4.3), we can see that Pk|k
is a function of Pk−1|k−1 and |Ak|, namely
Pk|k = KF(Pk−1|k−1, |Ak|). (4.9)
The validity of DP lies on a straightforward but important nature of dynamic
state estimation systems — the uncertainty Φ(Pk|k) of the current estimation, is
generally increasing with that of previous estimation, Φ(Pk−1|k−1). It indicates that
when Ak is fixed, in order to maximize Φ(Pk|k) subject to |AK+1| + |AK+2| + · · · +
|Ak| = s, one first needs to solve a subproblem that maximizes Φ(Pk−1|k−1) subject
to |AK+1|+ |AK+2|+ · · ·+ |Ak−1| = s− |Ak|. Then among all the feasible choices of
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|Ak|, we choose the one that corresponds to the largest Φ(Pk|k), i.e.,
max
k∑
j=K+1
|Aj |=s
Φ(Pk|k) =
max
|Ak|
KF
 maxk−1∑
j=K+1
|Aj |=s−|Ak|
Φ(Pk−1|k−1), |Ak|
 .
(4.10)
Denote
ΦDP (s, k) = max
k∑
j=K+1
|Aj |=s
Φ(Pk|k),
∀s ∈ {0, 1, · · · , c}, k ∈ {K + 1, · · · , K +N},
(4.11)
equation (4.10) becomes
ΦDP (s, k) = max
0≤r≤s
KF (ΦDP (s− r, k − 1), r) ,
∀s ∈ {0, 1, · · · , c}, k ∈ {K + 1, · · · , K +N}.
(4.12)
By definition, the optimal solution of (4.4) is ΦDP (c,K + N). From (4.12) we can
see that in order to obtain ΦDP (c,K + N), we need to compute and store all the
(c + 1) × N values of ΦDP (s, k). Furthermore, in order to trace back the optimal
attack strategy, we also need to store another (c+ 1)×N numbers, which are given
by
C(s, k) = arg max
0≤r≤s
KF (ΦDP (s− r, k − 1), r) ,
∀s ∈ {0, 1, · · · , c}, k ∈ {K + 1, · · · , K +N}.
(4.13)
In this way, once ΦDP (c,K + N) is obtained, the best attack strategy can be found
by
|Ak| = C(c− |Ak+1|, k),∀k ∈ {K + 1, · · · , K +N − 1}, (4.14)
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where
|AK+N | = C(c,K +N). (4.15)
Therefore, the memory cost of DP is proportional to 2N(c+ 1) = O(Nc).
Run-time Complexity: It is clear that calculating the first column in ΦDP , i.e.,
ΦDP (s,K + 1), ∀s ∈ {0, 1, · · · , c}, has complexity on the order of M(c + 1). This is
because given the steady state PK|K , it only takes c+ 1 repetitions of (4.8) and (4.3)
to calculate the first column of ΦDP . When k > K+1, there are s+1 possible values of
|Ak| for determining ΦDP (s, k), which needs totally 1+2+· · ·+(c+1) = (c+1)(c+2)/2
repetitions of (4.8) and (4.3). Therefore, the run-time complexity of DP is
φ4(n)=M(c+ 1)+(N − 1)M (c+ 1)(c+ 2)
2
= O(nc2). (4.16)
As we can see, if c keeps constant, then DP is a linear-time algorithm and has smaller
complexity than greedy algorithms.
4.2 Numerical Results
Numerical results for a target tracking example are presented in this section to
illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed suboptimal solutions. Two cases involv-
ing position sensors and position-velocity sensors are presented to show the attack
strategies of the adversary under different sensor configurations.
4.2.1 System with Position Sensors
For the system with position sensors, the parameters used in the target tracking
example are provided below. The system has M = 3 position sensors with sampling
64
interval T = 1. The system input uk = 0. The system state transition matrix is
F =
 1 T
0 1
 (4.17)
The measurement matrix for each sensor is
H =
[
1 0
]
(4.18)
The standard deviation (s.d.) of the system process noise is σv = 0.02. The s.d.s of
the measurement noise for the three sensors are σw1 = 0.2, σw2 = 0.4, and σw3 = 0.5,
respectively. The sparsity constraint for the adversary is c = 5, meaning that the
adversary has to choose 5 spots to attack the system over M = 3 sensors and over
N = 6 time steps in order to maximize the trace of the state covariance matrix by
the end of the attack period.
To begin with, SFS is used to find the suboptimal solution. Table 1 shows the
found attack strategy. The numbers shown in the table denote the order of sensors
for the adversary to attack. The reason why the adversary attacks the first sensor is
Sensor 1 has the smallest measurement variance. Examing (4.3), the second item is
a diagonal matrix, with only position variance on the diagonal. In order to maximize
the trace of PK+6|K+6, in each iteration, it is better to minimize the matrix P−1k|k. The
result shows that the adversary attacks Sensor 1 from time K+ 3 to time K+ 6. The
interesting thing for this method is that it also provides the adversary with an attack
strategy if he/she wants to attack the system less than c times because of the greedy
nature of the SFS. Another observation is that the attacker tends to attack sensors
in the times near the end, which is due to the “forgetting” property of Kalman filter,
implying that the sensor data in the past will become less and less important as time
goes on.
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Table 1. Attack Strategy for Position Sensors
Time/Sensor K+1 K+2 K+3 K+4 K+5 K+6
Sensor 1 5 3 2 1
Sensor 2 4
Sensor 3
For the same parameter setup, different optimization algorithms including DP
and exhaustive search (EXS) are tested, and the simulation results are shown in Table
2. Tr(·) denotes the trace operator for a matrix. The number of sensors is 3, the
problem size (MN) is enlarged by increasing the attack time period from 6 to 20.
From Table 2, it is clear that SFS and SFS-SS have a lower complexity than the
SBS and the EXS. DP is a linear-time algorithm, which has the least computational
complexity. As the size of the problem increases, it will be not feasible to get the
optimal solution using EXS. In this example, all the approaches can find the global
optimum at least when the EXS is still feasible.
For the case the adversary attacks the system from K + 1 to K + 10, the system
parameters are set the same as above. The results for the optimal attack strat-
egy (10, 1), (9, 1), (8, 1), (10, 2), (7, 1), the strategy to attack backwards (9, 1), (9, 2),
(10, 1), (10, 2), (10, 3), and the strategy to attack the best sensor (10, 1), (9, 1), (8, 1),
(7, 1), (6, 1) are shown in Fig. 17, where (k, i) denotes that the adversary attacks
sensor i at time k. It is clear that the maximal system estimation error is achieved
by using the optimal attack strategy.
4.2.2 System with Position and Velocity Sensors
For the system with position and velocity sensors, transition matrix F and input
uk are set the same as in Section 4.2.1. The measurement matrix H for each sensor
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Table 2. Performance of Different Algorithms
Alg. Size Time (s) Tr(PK+N |K+N)
18 0.025 0.033
SFS 30 0.064 0.033
60 0.249 0.033
18 0.045 0.033
SBS 30 0.239 0.033
60 1.982 0.033
18 0.047 0.033
SFS-SS 30 0.128 0.033
60 0.495 0.033
18 0.015 0.033
DP 30 0.025 0.033
60 0.049 0.033
18 2.269 0.033
EXS 30 79.383 0.033
60 − −
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Fig. 17. Trace of MSE for the system with three sensors
is a 2× 2 identity matrix. In this subsection, the determinant of the state covariance
matrix is used as the objective function. Here we investigate three cases with different
system parameters. In Case I, we set σv = 0.02, and the correlation coefficients
between position and velocity measurements for the 3 sensors are ρ1 = 0.5, ρ2 =
0, ρ3 = −0.5, σw1p = σw1v = 0.5, σw2p = σw2v = 0.5, and σw3p = σw3v = 0.5. Using
SFS, the optimal attack strategy is shown in Table 3. The first item in (4.3) is a
positive semidefinte matrix with negative off-diagonal elements. The information from
Sensor 3 R−13 will enlarge the diagonal elements and lower the off-diagonal elements,
leading to smaller determinant of Pk|k, so the adversary will attack Sensor 3 first. For
Sensors 1 and 2, the inverse of covariance matrices are R−11 =
 5.3 −2.7
−2.7 5.3
 and
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Table 3. Attack Strategy for Case I
Time/Sensor K+1 K+2 K+3 K+4 K+5 K+6
Sensor 1 5 2
Sensor 2 4
Sensor 3 3 1
Table 4. Attack Strategy for Case II
Time/Sensor K+1 K+2 K+3 K+4 K+5 K+6
Sensor 1 4 2
Sensor 2
Sensor 3 5 3 1
R−12 =
 4 0
0 4
. Comparing with Sensor 2, Sensor 1 will make P−1k|k larger. Thus the
adversary will attack Sensor 1 next instead of Sensor 2. In Case II, we set σv = 0.001,
all the other parameters are set the same as in Case I, and the attack strategy is
shown in Table 4. From Table 4, it is clear that as the variance of the state process
noise decreases, the adversary will attack the sensors with correlated measurements.
In Case III, we set σw2p = σw2v = 0.2, all the other parameters are set the same as
in Case II, and the optimal attack strategy is shown in Table 5. In this case, instead
of attacking the sensors with correlated measurements, the adversary will attack the
sensor with the smallest covariance.
To compare the greedy approach and DP, we consider the case that only involves
position sensors under different configurations. The standard deviation σv of the
system process noise varies from 0.01 to 1. The sparsity constraint for the adversary
is c = 10, meaning that the adversary has to choose 10 spots to attack the system
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Table 5. Attack Strategy for Case III
Time/Sensor K+1 K+2 K+3 K+4 K+5 K+6
Sensor 1
Sensor 2 5 4 3 2 1
Sensor 3
over M = 10 sensors and over N = 6 time steps in order to maximize the trace of the
state covariance matrix by the end of the attack period. Furthermore, the attacker
uses the trace of covariance matrix as the uncertainty measure. For each value of σv,
we run 100 Monte-Carlo trials, and in each trial we set the standard deviations σw of
the measurement noise for the ten sensors by drawing ten values from uniform (0, 1)
distribution. Then, we count the number of simulations where DP gives the same,
larger, and smaller Tr(PK+N |K+N) compared with the greedy approach SFS.
In Fig. 18, we compare the attack performance of greedy approach and DP under
different σv’s. It can be shown that for a small σv, the two algorithms mostly give
the same results, and greedy approach is performing better; however, as σv increases
up to 0.1, DP begins to outperform greedy approach significantly. The underlying
reason comes from the different frameworks of SFS and DP. In each round of SFS,
attacker chooses one sensor-time pair to attack by running Kalman filter through all
the snap shots K + 1 up to K + N . On the other hand, DP determines ΦDP (s, k)
only based on the previous c + 1 states at snap shot k − 1. Therefore, when σv is
small, or the system state evolves smoothly, SFS will have a better sense of “global
view” than DP; however, for a large σv where the prediction gives little information,
DP gives more credit for the current measurement which is more informative, and
hence outperforms SFS significantly.
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Fig. 18. Comparison between greedy approach (SFS) and DP.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, sparse attack strategies in multi-sensor dynamic systems have
been studied from the adversary’s point of view. By assuming that the system de-
fender can perfectly detect and remove the sensors attacked by the adversary, this
becomes an integer programming problem. As the size of the problem increases, it
will be infeasible to find the optimal solution. Different suboptimal algorithms: SFS,
SBS, SFS-SS, and DP have been studied and corresponding attack strategies were
developed. Their computational complexities have been analyzed and their perfor-
mances have been evaluated and compared based on simulations. All the proposed
suboptimal solutions can provide very good performance (in some examples they lead
to the optimal solution) with significantly lower complexities. It has been shown that
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the greedy approach outperforms DP when the system process noise is small, since it
has a more long-term view of the problem. On the other hand, DP performs better
when the process noise is large and the state is more unpredictable.
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CHAPTER 5
A GAME BETWEEN STATE ESTIMATION AND MALICIOUS
ATTACKS
We have studied attack strategies from the adversary perspective. In this chapter, the
problem of false information attack on and Kalman filter’s defense of state estimation
in dynamic multi-sensor systems is investigated from a game theoretic perspective.
The relationship between Kalman filter and the adversary can be regarded as a two-
person zero-sum game. Under which condition both sides of the game will reach
the Nash equilibrium is investigated in this chapter. The multi-sensor Kalman filter
system and the adversary are supposed to be rational players. Kalman filter and
the adversary have to choose their respective subsets of sensors to perform system
state estimation and false information injection. It is shown how both sides pick their
strategies in order to gain more and lose less.
5.1 A Target Tracking Example
In this section, we give a concrete target tracking example, which is also discussed
in [37]. Assume that the target moves in a one-dimensional space according to a
discrete white noise acceleration model [31], which can still be described by the plant
and measurement equations provided in (2.1) and (2.2). In such a system, the state
is defined as xk = [ξk ξ˙k]
T , where ξk and ξ˙k denote the target’s position and velocity
at time k respectively. The input uk is a zero sequence. The state transition matrix
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is
Fk =
 1 T
0 1
 , ∀k (5.1)
where T is the sensor sampling interval. The process noise is vk = Γvk, where vk is a
zero mean white acceleration noise, with variance σ2v , and the vector gain multiplying
the scalar process noise is given by Γ = [T 2/2 T ]
T
. The covariance matrix of the
process noise is therefore Q = σ2vΓΓ
T . The observation matrix is given as
Hk,i = [1 0], ∀k, i (5.2)
Once the system model is known, it is straightforward for both Kalman filter and the
adversary to calculate Kalman filter’s state covariance matrix PK|K as in [31]. Using
Proposition 1, we can obtain the trace of the total state estimation MSE matrix:
Tr(MSE) = Tr(PK|K + WKΣKWTK) (5.3)
5.2 Noncooperative Two-Person Zero-Sum Game
In a noncooperative two-person zero-sum game [38], we assume that there are
two players, referred to as Players 1 and 2, and an m × n payoff matrix L = {lij}.
Each entry of the matrix is an outcome of the game corresponding to a particular
pair of decisions made by both players. Player 1 gets m rows of the matrix as his/her
strategy set, while for Player 2, the strategy set is the corresponding n columns of
the same matrix.
In our problem, suppose there are totally M sensors, Kalman filter and the
adversary can choose any non-empty subsets of sensors to perform state estimation
and attack respectively, which means m = n = 2M − 1. L is a square matrix of
the size (2M − 1)× (2M − 1). The payoff in the game between Kalman filter system
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and the adversary will be the trace of the state estimation MSE matrix. For each
set of sensors he/she chooses to attack, the adversary is under a total injected noise
power constraint. The Nash equilibrium between Kalman filter and the adversary is
achieved by solving the minimax optimization problem.
Let {row i, column j} be a pair of strategies adopted by the players, and the
corresponding outcome (payoff) be lij, which means that Player 1 should pay Player
2 the amount of lij. If li∗j ≤ li∗j∗ ≤ lij∗ , for all i = 1, . . . ,m and all j = 1, . . . , n, the
pair {i∗, j∗} is said to constitute a saddle-point equilibrium, and the game is said to
have a saddle point in pure strategy. On the other hand, if the pair of inequalities
does not exist, one can derive the mixed strategy to obtain the equilibrium. A mixed
strategy is a probability distribution on the space of the player’s pure strategies. A
mixed strategy allows for a player to select a pure strategy randomly with a certain
probability. In this case, the utility function u is defined as
u(x,y) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xilijyj = x
TLy (5.4)
where x and y are the probability distribution vectors for the mixed strategies. Also,
x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , where the set X = {x ∈ Rm : x ≥ 0, ∑mi=1 xi = 1}, and Y is defined
in the same way. Kalman filter playing as defender is trying to minimize the utility
function u(x,y) by choosing the best defending strategy, while the attacker wants to
maximize the utility function by choosing the best attack strategy. For the payoff
matrix L of size m× n, a vector of x∗ is the best mixed strategy for Kalman filter if
Um(L) = max
y∈Y
(x∗)TLy ≤ max
y∈Y
xTLy,x ∈ X (5.5)
The Um(L) is known as the average security level (loss ceiling) of the defender, the
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average security level (gain-floor) of the attacker Um can also be defined as below,
Um(L) = min
x∈X
xTLy∗ ≥ min
x∈X
xTLy,y ∈ Y (5.6)
It always holds that Um(L) = Um(L) for mixed strategies in noncooperative
two-person zero-sum game. The saddle point in the mixed strategies is defined when
the two bounds are equal to each other, which can be found by solving the following
linear programming problem [38]:
min
x∈X
bu (5.7)
s.t. LTx ≤ bu1
xT1 = 1
x ≥ 0
where bu denotes a constant upper bound. For the attacker, the formula is the other
way around,
max
y∈Y
bl (5.8)
s.t. Ly ≥ bl1
yT1 = 1
y ≥ 0
where bl denotes a constant lower bound. From the formulation above, it is easy
to see that (5.8) is the dual form of the optimization problem (5.7). The optimal
function for the two problems are the same. Interested readers are referred to [38] for
more details.
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5.3 Game With Incomplete Information
So far, it has been assumed that the defender has the knowledge on what type
of false information has been injected by the adversary to the sensors. In practice,
this knowledge may not be readily available to the defender. So let us suppose that
Kalman filter does not know the type of false information the adversary uses to
attack the system. If the adversary has S types of false information like independent
or dependent false information as discussed earlier in the chapter, there should be
S (m × n) payoff matrices Lk = {lkij}, and
S∑
k=1
pk = 1, k ∈ S. Based on pk, the
prior probability of the kth false information type, the Bayesian equilibrium can be
achieved by solving the following linear optimization problem.
min
x∈X
bu (5.9)
s.t.
S∑
k=1
pkLk
Tx ≤ bu1
xT1 = 1
x ≥ 0
where bu denotes a constant upper bound.
5.4 Numerical Results
In the example, for simplicity and ease of presentation, we assume that there are
three sensors denoted as {z1, z2, z3} in the system having independent measurement
noises with noise standard deviations σw1 = 3, σw2 = 4, σw3 = 5. The system process
noise s.d. is σv = 0.5, sensors’ sampling interval is T = 1s, and the system initial
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Table 6. Payoff Matrix (Independent Case)
KF/At z1 z2 z3 z1z2 z1z3 z2z3 z1z2z3
z1 25.4 4.7 4.7 25.4 25.4 4.7 25.4
z2 7.2 23.5 7.2 7.2 7.2 23.5 7.2
z3 10 10 23.6 10 10 10 10
z1z2 13.5 6.6 3.4 13.5 13.5 6.6 13.5
z1z3 16.4 3.8 5.4 16.4 16.4 3.8 16.4
z2z3 5.0 12.4 8.0 5.0 5.0 12.4 5.0
z1z2z3 10.2 5.2 3.9 10.2 10.2 5.2 10.2
state x0 is assumed to follow a N (xˆ0|0, P0|0) distribution, where xˆ0|0 = [1 1]T and
P0|0 =
 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.5
 .
The adversary can choose any combination of sensors from the set P1 = {z1, z2, z3,
z1z2, z1z3, z2z3, z1z2z3} to attack with the power constraint of
∑3
1 σbi
2 = 100, where
σbi is the s.d. of the random noise injected to Sensor i. Likewise, the defender can
choose any combination of sensors to perform state estimation, and its strategy set
is the same: P2 = P1. The game is played as below: if the defender uses data from
Sensors i and j for state estimation, while the adversary attacks Sensors i and k, then
system state estimation is affected by the false information from the ith sensor only.
In this game, the trace of the state estimation MSE matrix is regarded as the
payoff of the game. In the games of the independent and dependent attacks, the
system is attacked according to the strategies provided in Propositions 2 and 3 re-
spectively. Let us assume that the adversary attacks the sensors at time k = 100, and
the payoff matrix is given in Tables 6 and 7. From Tables 6 and 7, we can see that
there is no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Instead, we use mixed strategies to find
the Nash Equilibrium. In order to obtain the optimal probability vector, we solve the
optimization problem formulated in (5.7). The solution to (5.7) is the optimal prob-
ability vector for the defender, and the dual solution is the optimal mixed strategy
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Table 7. Payoff Matrix (Dependent Case)
KF/At z1 z2 z3 z1z2 z1z3 z2z3 z1z2z3
z1 25.4 4.7 4.7 13.2 15.9 4.7 10.3
z2 7.2 23.5 7.2 9.3 7.2 13.3 8.6
z3 10 10 23.6 10 11.0 12.1 10.5
z1z2 13.5 6.6 3.4 16.7 12.4 5.6 15.6
z1z3 16.4 3.8 5.4 15.0 18.1 4.2 15.0
z2z3 5.0 12.4 8.0 6.8 5.3 15.5 8.2
z1z2z3 10.2 5.2 3.9 12.5 11.1 6.2 13.4
for the attacker. The optimal solutions for independent- and dependent-attack cases
are shown in Tables 8 and 9 respectively.
For the independent case, we can see from Table 6 that (6, 6) and (7, 7) elements
of the payoff matrix (L) are the smallest among the seven diagonal elements. This
means that in the worst cases for the KF when its chosen sensor combination happens
to be the same as that being attacked by the adversary, the strategies z2z3 and z1z2z3
will lead to the smallest state estimation MSEs. In addition, for the KF, the values
of last two rows are relatively small. As a result, for the KF, the probabilities of the
last two strategies (z2z3 and z1z2z3) are much larger than those of other strategies,
which are shown in Table 8.
In the dependent case, for the KF, the probabilities for the last two pure strategies
(z2z3 and z1z2z3) are relatively large as shown in Table 9. This can be explained
similarly as in the independent case. In L, the entries of the rows corresponding to
z3, z1z2, and z1z3 are relatively large, so the KF assigns nearly zero probabilities to
these three strategies. In the first two rows of L, even though the diagonal elements
are large, the rest of the elements are relatively small, so strategies z1 and z2 are
assigned significant probabilities for the KF as shown in Table 9.
When the information is incomplete, the defender is not sure whether indepen-
dent or dependent false information will be injected by the adversary. Table 10 shows
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Table 8. Optimal Strategy Probabilities (Independent Case)
Player z1 z2 z3 z1z2 z1z3 z2z3 z1z2z3
KF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.60
Attacker 0.14 0.22 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.24
Table 9. Optimal Strategy Probabilities (Dependent Case)
Player z1 z2 z3 z1z2 z1z3 z2z3 z1z2z3
KF 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.33
Attacker 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.50
Kalman filter’s best defending strategy under the condition that Kalman filter can
be attacked by the two types of false information equally probably. This result could
be explained by the results for the case with complete information about the type of
attacks. Clearly from Tables 8 and 9, the defender assigns significant probabilities
to the last two strategies (z2z3 and z1z2z3). As a result, the optimal strategy for the
case with incomplete knowledge of the type of the false information also assigns most
probabilities to the last two strategies.
We also provide a simulation result to demonstrate the optimality of the derived
strategy for the independent case. In this example, four different scenarios are ex-
plored: 1) there is no attack and the KF uses all the sensors’ data; 2) the KF uses the
optimal mixed strategy; 3) the KF uses a mixed strategy to pick each pure strategy
with an equal probability 1/7; 4) the KF always chooses the first sensor to do the sys-
tem estimation. In Scenarios 2)-4), the attacker injects false information according to
his/her optimal mixed strategy to the sensors at time k = 100. The resulting position
estimation MSEs are plotted in Fig. 19. It is clear that the optimal mixed strategy
provides the best defense against the attacker, with the minimum increase in the
Table 10. Optimal Strategy Probabilities (Incomplete Information Case)
Player z1 z2 z3 z1z2 z1z3 z2z3 z1z2z3
KF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.55
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MSE after the attack. Fig. 20 shows the case when the defender’s knowledge about
the attack false information is incomplete. Let us suppose that Kalman filter can
be attacked by independent and dependent false information with equal probability.
The results corresponding to three different defending strategies, the best defending
strategy for independent attacks, the best defending strategy for dependent attacks,
and the best defending strategy for incomplete information case, are shown in Fig.
20. It is clear that the optimal defending strategy derived from (5.9) leads to smaller
MSE after the attack than the other two defending strategies corresponding to the
independent and dependent attacks respectively.
95 100 105 110
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Iteration Number k
Po
si
tio
n 
M
SE
 
 
Optimal Mixed Strategy
 1
st Pure Strategy
No Attack
 Equally Probable Mixed Strategy
Fig. 19. Optimal Mixed Strategy vs. Other Options
5.5 Conclusion
The relationship between Kalman filter and the adversary has been investigated
in a two-person zero-sum game. Kalman filter (defender) tries to achieve more accu-
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about Attacks
rate system state estimation and avoid being attacked by the adversary. The adver-
sary tries to mislead Kalman filter as much as possible. Both sides of the game will
reach a Nash Equilibrium through the mixed strategies. Using minimax techniques,
we found the mixed strategy saddle point in the game.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Overall, resilient dynamic state estimation in the presence of false information in-
jection attacks has been studied from different aspects. Under the assumption that
Kalman filter is not aware of the existence of false information, many optimal attack
strategies that maximize the system estimation error were derived from either trace
or determinant perspective. For the case where the sensors only measure the position,
the adversary could either inject independent or dependent false information into the
sensor readings, it was proved that under the same power constraint, the dependent
false information will incur more system estimation error than the independent one
does in terms of the trace of the state estimation MSE matrix. For the case where
the sensors measure both the position and velocity, the optimal attack strategies
were derived and demonstrated via simulations. The optimal attack strategy, which
maximizes the determinant of Kalman filter’s MSE matrix, has been studied and the
closed-form optimal solution was provided. The impact of the correlation coefficients
between different components of the injected bias noise on the volume of the error
ellipse for Kalman filter’s state estimation was also studied through simulations. As
for the multi-sensor case, an equivalent sensor was utilized in order to simplify the
problem.
In order to detect the false information injected by the adversary, an optimal
Bayesian detector that minimizes the average state estimation MSE was derived.
This detector can be coupled with different defending strategies. In this disserta-
tion, defending strategies of discarding data after detection and incorporating data
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after detection were studied. The Minimum mean square error estimator was also
investigated given all the system information. But the minimum mean square error
estimator is not robust when there is a mismatch between the attack strategy assumed
by the defender and the actual one adopted by the attacker. The optimal Bayesian
detector coupled with defending strategy of discarding data after detection proved to
be robust through simulations.
Sparse attack strategies were also investigated under the assumption that the
defender can perfectly detect the false information and remove the sensors once they
are corrupted by the false information injected by the adversary. The adversary aims
to maximize the MSE matrix of the system state estimate by the end of the at-
tack period under the constraint that he/she can only attack the system a few times
over the sensors and over the time. Greedy search and dynamic programming based
approaches were utilized to obtain suboptimal attack strategies since the optimal ex-
haustive search becomes intractable even when the problem size increases moderately.
As for the greedy search, SFS, SBS, and SFS-SS were studied and evaluated via sim-
ulations. The performances of greedy search and dynamic programming were also
compared. The greedy search outperforms dynamic programming when the system
process noise is small. Meanwhile, dynamic programming outperforms the greedy
search when the system process noise is larger. This is because the greedy search has
a better global view than dynamic programming regarding the system estimation.
The relation between the defender and the adversary was further studied using
the game theory. It was supposed that the defender and the adversary are both ratio-
nal player. It was shown how both sides choose strategies in order to gain more and
lose less. Two cases where the defender either has complete information or incomplete
information about attack strategies, which the adversary adopts, were both studied
in a two-person-zero-sum game. A Nash equilibrium was finally achieved by solv-
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ing a linear programming problem. For the defender, different defending strategies
were compared in the simulations. The defending strategies obtained via the Nash
equilibrium help the system maintain a much better estimation performance.
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ABBREVIATIONS
CBD Conventional Bayesian Detection
CSD Chi-Square Detection
DOE Department of Energy
DP Dynamic Programming
EMC Energy Management Centers
EMSE Extra Mean Square Error
EXS Exhaustive Search
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
GPS Global Positioning System
KF Kalman Filter
LRT Likelihood Ratio Test
MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output
MSE Mean Square Error
OBDD Optimal Bayesian Detection and Discarding Sensor Data
OBDI Optimal Bayesian Detection and Incorporating Sensor Data
PDF Probability Density Function
QCQP Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Program
RVA Richmond Virginia
SBS Sequential Backward Selection
SFS Sequential Forward Selection
SFS-SS Simplex Improved Sequential Forward Selection
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
VCU Virginia Commonwealth University
86
REFERENCES
[1] F. F. Wu, K. Moslehi, and A. Bose. “Power System Control Centers: Past,
Present, and Future”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE 93.11 (2005), pp. 1890–
1908.
[2] M.N. Mladenovic, M. Abbas, and T. McPherson. “Development of socially
sustainable traffic-control principles for self-driving vehicles: The ethics of an-
thropocentric design”. In: the 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Ethics
in Science, Technology and Engineering. 2014, pp. 1–8.
[3] E. Mills. “Hackers broke into FAA air traffic control system”. In: The Wall
Street Journal (2009), A6.
[4] N. Leavitt. “Researchers Fight to Keep Implanted Medical Devices Safe from
Hackers”. In: Computer 43.8 (2010), pp. 11–14.
[5] S. Sridhar, A. Hahn, and M. Govindarasu. “Cyber-Physical System Security for
the Electric Power Grid”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE 100.1 (2012), pp. 210–
224.
[6] National Energy Technology Laboratory. “A Systems View of the Modern
Grid”. In: U.S. Department of Energy. 2007.
[7] Y. Huang et al. “Bad data injection in smart grid: attack and defense mecha-
nisms”. In: IEEE Communications Magazine 51.1 (2013), pp. 27–33.
[8] Y. Liu, M.K. Reiter, and P. Ning. “False data injection attacks agianst state
estimation in electric power grids”. In: Proc. the 16th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. Chicago, IL, 2009.
87
[9] X. Song, P. Willett, and S. Zhou. “Jammer detection and estimation with
MIMO radar”. In: 2012 Conference Record of the Forty Sixth Asilomar Con-
ference on Signals, Systems and Computers (ASILOMAR). 2012, pp. 1312–
1316.
[10] H. Chen and B. Himed. “Analyzing and improving MIMO radar detection
performance in the presence of cybersecurity attacks”. In: 2016 IEEE Radar
Conference (RadarConf). 2016, pp. 1–4.
[11] D. M. Wolpert Z. Ghahramani. “Computational principles of movement neu-
roscience”. In: Nature Neuroscience 3 (2000), pp. 1212–1217.
[12] L. Jia, R.J. Thomas, and L. Tong. “Malicious data attack on real-time elec-
tricity market”. In: Proc. International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and
Signal Processing. Prague, Czech Republic, 2011, pp. 5952–5955.
[13] O. Kosut et al. “Malicious Data Attack on Smart Grid State Estimation: Attack
Strategies and Countermeasures”. In: Proc. First IEEE International Confer-
ence on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm). Gaithersburg, MD,
2010, pp. 220–225.
[14] L. Jia, R. J. Thomas, and L. Tong. “On the nonlinearity effects on malicious
data attack on power system”. In: Power and Energy Society General Meeting.
San Diego, CA, 2012, pp. 1–8.
[15] M. A. Rahman and H. Mohsenian-Rad. “False data injection attacks with
incomplete information against smart power grids”. In: Proc. Global Commu-
nications Conference. San Diego, CA, 2012, pp. 3153–3158.
88
[16] J. Kim, L. Tong, and R. J. Thomas. “Data Framing Attack on State Esti-
mation”. In: IEEE Trans. on Aerospace and Electronic Systems 49.3 (2013),
pp. 1637–1653.
[17] X. Song et al. “The MIMO Radar and Jammer Games”. In: IEEE Trans. on
Signal Processing 60.2 (2012), pp. 687–699.
[18] R. Niu and L. Huie. “System State Estimation in the Presence of False In-
formation Injection”. In: Statistical Signal Processing Workshop (SSP). Ann
Arbor, MI, 2012, pp. 385–388.
[19] W. Xiong, A. Mukherjee, and H. M. Kwon. “MIMO Cognitive Radio User
Selection With and Without Primary Channel State Information”. In: IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology 65.2 (2016), pp. 985–991.
[20] W. Xiong et al. “Hybrid onboard and ground based digital channelizer beam-
forming for SATCOM interference mitigation and protection”. In: Proc. SPIE
Sensors and Systems for Space Applications IX. Vol. 9838. 2016.
[21] N. Zhang S. K. Das K. Kant. Handbook on Securing Cyber-physical Critical
Infrastructure: Foundations and Challenges. Elsevier, 2012.
[22] C. Yang, L. Kaplan, and E. Blasch. “Performance Measures of Covariance and
Information Matrices in Resource Management for Target State Estimation”.
In: IEEE Trans. on Aerospace and Electronic Systems 48.3 (2012), pp. 2594–
2612.
[23] C. Yang et al. “Optimal Placement of Heterogeneous Sensors for Targets with
Gaussian Priors”. In: IEEE Trans. on Aerospace and Electronic Systems 49.3
(2013), pp. 1637–1653.
89
[24] X. Lin and Y. Bar-Shalom. “Multisensor target tracking performance with bias
compensation”. In: IEEE Trans. Aerosp. Electron. Syst. 42.3 (2006), pp. 1139–
1149.
[25] J. Lu and R. Niu. “False Information Injection Attack on Dynamic State Esti-
mation in Multi-Sensor Systems”. In: Proc. of the 17th International Confer-
ence on Information Fusion. Salamanca, Spain, 2014.
[26] J. Lu and R. Niu. “Malicious Attacks on State Estimation in Multi-Sensor
Dynamic Systems”. In: Proc. IEEE Workshop on Information Forensics and
Security. Atlanta, Georgia, USA, 2014.
[27] J. Lu and R. Niu. “False Information Detection with Minimum Mean Squared
Errors for Bayesian Estimation”. In: Proc. The 49th Annual Conference on
Information Systems and Sciences. Baltimore, Maryland, 2015.
[28] J. Lu and R. Niu. “Sparse Attacking Strategies in Multi-Sensor Dynamic Sys-
tems Maximizing State Estimation Errors”. In: Proc. 41st IEEE International
Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing. Shanghai, China, 2016.
[29] J. Lu, R. Niu, and P. Han. “Optimal space-time attacks on system state esti-
mation under a sparsity constraint”. In: Proc. SPIE Sensors and Systems for
Space Applications IX. 2016.
[30] J. Lu and R. Niu. “A State Estimation and Malicious Attack Game in Multi-
Sensor Dynamic Systems”. In: Proc. the 18th International Conference on In-
formation Fusion. Washington, USA, 2015.
[31] Y. Bar-Shalom, X.R. Li, and T. Kirubarajan. Estimation with Applications to
Tracking and Navigation. New York: Wiley, 2001.
90
[32] R. Niu. Dynamic System State Estimation in the Presence of Continuous False
Information Injection. Tech. rep. Extension Grant from Visiting Faculty Re-
search Program, Air Force Research Laboratory Information Directorate, 2012.
[33] B. Tang, J. Tang, and Y. Peng. “MIMO Radar Waveform Design in Colored
Noise Based on Information Theory”. In: IEEE Trans. on Signal Processing
58.9 (2010), pp. 4684 –4697.
[34] Y. Bar-Shalom, P.K. Willett, and X. Tian. Tracking and Data Fusion: A Hand-
book of Algorithms. Storrs, CT: YBS Publishing, 2011.
[35] L.M. Kaplan. “Global node selection for localization in a distributed sensor
network”. In: IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems 42.1
(2006), pp. 113–135.
[36] P. Pudil, J. Novoviov, and J. Kittler. “Floating search methods in feature
selection”. In: Pattern Recognition Letters 15.11 (1994), pp. 1119–1125.
[37] C. Miller et al. “Estimation of mobile vehicle range amp and position using
the tobit Kalman filter”. In: IEEE 53rd Annual Conference on Decision and
Control (CDC). 2014, pp. 5001–5007.
[38] T. Basar and G. J. Olsder. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. Philadel-
phia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1999.
91
VITA
Jingyang Lu was born in Jiamusi, Heilongjiang Province, China, 1988. He attended
Jiamusi NO.1 Middle School.
Jingyang Lu got his Bachelor’s Degree of Science in Harbin Institute of Tech-
nology in August 2012. He enrolled in the doctoral program in the Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering at Virginia Commonwealth University in 2012.
His research interests are in the areas of statistical signal processing and its applica-
tions, including tracking, estimation, detection, and information fusion. During his
Ph.D. program, he got his Master’s Degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in 2015. He published 6 papers on dynamic system state estimation under the false
information injection attacks.
Jingyang Lu likes playing basketball. During his college, he played for the De-
partment of Engineering. When he was in VCU, he usually joined the intramural.
92
